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After the JDP came to power in Turkey in 2002, much has changed in Turkish foreign policy as
well  as  profound  changes  in  international,  regional  and  domestic  contexts  surrounding  it.
Particularly fluctuations in Turkish-Iranian relations in the course of seventeen years have been
very puzzling, and complicated, which made it worthy of study. Once, relations between the two
states have so improved that some pundits regarded it as an evidence of shift of axis in Turkish
foreign policy. Soon later, Ankara and Tehran embroiled in a regional competition that reminded
the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry of the 16th century with its strategic and sectarian implications.
Later on, they have developed amicable relations. Against this background one may question how
could we understand that very dynamic nature of Turkish-Iranian relations? Considering this
complicated and dynamic picture, we should analyse decisive factors in the relations between
Ankara and Tehran. In other words, what has changed - and has been changing - in Turkish-
Iranian  relations  after  the  JDP?  In  order  to  comprehend  the  complicated  and  dynamic
interactions between Ankara and Tehran, this research goes beyond the JDP period in Turkey and
put forwards a review of the history of Turkish-Iranian relations. And then, it focuses on the JDP
period  and  analyse  relations  between  Ankara  and  Tehran  from  diplomatic,  economic  and
regional  perspectives.  Finally,  it  makes  some  speculations  on  the  future  of  Turkish-Iranian
relations.  It  argues  that  the  complicated  relationship  between  the  two  countries have  been
determined by a configuration of geopolitical context, structural factors, and the ruling elite. The
JDP  elite  have  employed  rationalization,  institutionalization  and  compartmentalization
strategies  to  further  Turkish-Iranian  relations.  However,  they  could  not  go  beyond  the
diplomatic culture that set the longer history of interactions between the two countries on a fine
course between bitter rivalry and friendly relations.
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1 The Justice and Development Party (JDP / Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), led by Recep
Tayyip  Erdoğan,  came  to  power  in  Turkey  in  November  2003.  Since  then,  it  has
dominated Turkish politics and a number of successive governments. In the course of
this time, much has changed in the Turkish political structure, domestic context, and in
both  international  and  regional  settings.  Foreign  policy  in  Turkey  has  also  been
fundamentally  transformed.  In  the  meantime,  Turkish-Iranian  relations  have
considerably improved. Indeed, the seventeen-year record of JDP rule in Turkey and its
implications  for  Turkish-Iranian  relations  are  worthy  of  study.  However,  the
relationship between Turkey and Iran has a history longer than the JDP rule in Turkey.
Considering their age-old acquaintance, the recent development of an apparently close
relationship between the two raises the following questions: What are the major trends
in  Turkish-Iranian  relations?  And,  how  has  the  JDP’s  rise  to  power  affected  those
relations? In other words, what has changed in the relationship between Turkey and
Iran since the JDP came to power? 
2 This  research  paper  aims  to  provide  a  trajectory  of  Turkish-Iranian  relations
particularly over the last two decades. It argues that throughout the long history of
bilateral relations between them, Turkey and Iran have developed a kind of diplomatic
culture in their dealings with each other. Although, there are apparent changes in their
bilateral relations since the JDP came to power, Turkey-Iran relations have remained
within the limits of that diplomatic culture which consists of the preservation of a ‘fine
line’ between a bitter rivalry and friendly relations, cooperation and conflict. Certainly,
a  number  of  geopolitical  and  structural  factors  have  been  effective  during  this
relationship. Nevertheless, political leaders play their role through their assessments of
structural factors, geopolitical context, and potential opportunities. Depending on the
various  configurations  of  geopolitical,  structural  and  leadership  factors,  Turkish-
Iranian relations have oscillated between fierce competition and cooperation. Despite
the  apparent  improvement  in  the  Turkish-Iranian  relationship  since  the  JDP
government, bilateral relations between the two countries have remained within the
borders of that diplomatic culture. In order to substantiate this argument, this paper
firstly provides an overview of Turkish-Iranian relations in recent history. After then, it
focuses  on  analysis  of  relations  between  the  two  states  particularly  under  the
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successive JDP governments. Then, it concludes with an overview and some speculation
on the future of Turkish-Iranian relations.
4
The historical background of
Turkish-Iranian relations
The history of relations between Turkey and Iran can be dated back to the sixteenth
century,  when  two  competing  imperial  systems,  the  Ottomans  and  the  Safavids,
consolidated their rulership over the respective countries. Turkey and Iran were both
former imperial centres, and the modern states established in these two countries are
considered successors to the Ottoman and the Safavid imperial rule that had dominated
most parts of Western Asia for centuries. 
Many  historians,  however,  have  been  inclined  to  attribute  the  history  of  Turkish-
Iranian relations to earlier centuries, because the two peoples knew each other long
before the migration of Turkic tribes into Asia Minor. The early encounters between
the  two  peoples  gradually  evolved  into  the  rise  of  a  distinctive  ‘Turco-Iranian
civilisation’ that spread into much of Western Asia through the tenth to thirteenth
centuries.1 The  Turco-Iranian  cultural  synthesis  gradually  faded  away  with  the
westward  march  of  the  Ottomans,  whereas  the  Safavids  engaged  in  crafting  a
distinctive sectarian identity in their dominions. 
As the nearby imperial systems, territorial and political conflicts prevailed over the
Ottoman-Safavid relations against interval periods of peace.  However,  the Ottoman-
Safavid rivalry and military conflicts were very intensive throughout the sixteenth and
the  early  seventeenth  centuries,  when  both  imperial  systems  were  committed  to
expanding  their  suzerainty.  The  imperial  wars  mostly  revolved  around  the  fertile
territories of Mesopotamia and the Caucasus. Competition for the control of the trade
routes passing through the aforementioned regions was also an important aspect of
that rivalry. After the Safavids consolidated their authority over Iran at the turn of the
sixteenth century and established Twelver Shiism as the ‘official’ creed, sectarian rifts
coloured the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry. On the one side, the Safavids tempted to mobilise
the  Turkmen  tribes  of  Anatolia  that  remained  sympathetic  to  the  religious  order,
Safawiye,  which consisted of militant Shiite dervishes (Qizilbash) headed by Safavid
Shah Ismail,  against  the  Ottoman rule.  On the other  side,  the  Ottomans positioned
themselves as the protectors of the orthodox, Sunni, understanding of Islam against the
“Qizilbash heretics”. The Ottomans under Sultan Selim I, fought Shah Ismail in 1514, at
the Battle of Chalderan. Before the battle, Sultan Selim obtained religious fatwas from
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the well-known ulama of the time, in order to sanctify the war against the Qizilbashs,
who were regarded as heretics threatening Islam.2
Actually, the Chalderan battle was the first of a dozen of long-lasting wars between the
two  empires,  in  which  the  hold  of  most  Caucasian  and  Mesopotamian  territories
including Tabriz and Baghdad was altered numerous times. The history of territorial
and religious conflicts with the Ottomans was inherited by the successors of the Safavid
dynasty, Nader Shah, Karim Han Zand and the Qajars. It is noteworthy that Nader Shah
attempted  to  diminish  the  religious  differences  between  the  two  countries,  which
ultimately failed due to Ottoman rejection of his offers. However, as an outcome of the
decreasing imperial powers of both the Ottomans and the successive Iranian rulers in
the  eighteenth  century,  the  competition  between  the  two  parties  settled  down.
Consequently, the Ottoman-Iranian fronts remained stable based on the Treaty of Qasr-
e  Shirin/Zuhab  dated  1639.  The  boundaries  specified  by  that  treaty  virtually
constituted contemporary borders  between Iran and Turkey.  For this  reason,  many
diplomats of both sides remember that treaty as the foundation of the centuries old
friendship between the two countries. 
The history of the conflicts, which either originated for imperial-geopolitical reasons,
or  from  sectarian  differences,  shaped  general  perceptions  on  Ottoman-Safavid
relations.  However,  the  Ottoman-Safavid  confrontation  did  not  prevent  cultural
transactions between Ottoman Turkey and Iran. There was mutual affection between
the two people  over  a  wide array of  art  and culture  from literature,  and music  to
architecture. Iranian scholars, artists and literary men were welcomed to the Ottoman
palace. Additionally, the two imperial administrations were heavily influenced by each
other in terms of political and military organisation. Finally, the Ottoman and Safavid
diplomatic exchanges, including letters of praise and gifts at times of peace, displayed
the close affinity between the two ruling dynasties.3 
Having  lost  their  imperial  grandeur  due  to  the  military  and  economic  advance  of
Western colonialist powers and the Russian Tsardom, to the detriment of Iranian and
the Ottoman territories, led both countries to embark on the process of modernisation
in  the  nineteenth  century.  Sectarian  differences  and the  imperial  competition  that
shaped  Ottoman-Iranian  relations  was  eclipsed  by  the  common  challenges  of
imperialism, and the modernity that preoccupied decision-makers in both countries.
Furthermore, the Ottoman attempts for modernisation were regarded as a model for
the  Iranian  modernisers  and  paved  the  ground for  improvements  in  the  Ottoman-
Iranian  relationship.  Moreover,  Qajar  Shahs  Naser  al-Din  and  Mozaffar  al-Din  paid
official  visits  to  Istanbul,  respectively  in  1873  and 1900,  as  a  part  of  their  trips  to
Europe, where they were warmly received.4 Eventually, this period witnessed intensive
intellectual, political and economic exchanges between the two countries. Istanbul then
became a centre for Iranian intellectuals  and tradesmen. There was also a growing
affinity  between  political  dissidents  of  the  two  monarchies  that  supported
constitutionalist  movements  in  both  countries.5 Even  the  Ottoman  ambassador  to
Tehran engaged in correspondence between the dissidents and the Shah at the turn of
the constitutional revolution in Iran.
Ottoman troops were mobilised inside the Iranian territories throughout WWI, but this
was not for the sake of territorial expansion, or in pursuit of a sectarian goal. As part of
its  war  strategy  of  waging  jihad  to  steer  Muslim  believers  against  the  British  and
Russian  imperialists,  the  Union  and  Progress  Party  leaders  in  power  at  that  time
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intended to confront British and Russian advances in Iran, keep its territorial integrity
and turn it into an ally. For a while, Ottoman forces, in coordination with Germany,
supported  the  Provisional  National  Government  based  in  Kermanshah  in  1915.
However, the government collapsed in the face of Russian advances.6 It was surprising
for the Ottomans that the Iranian foreign minister made territorial demands at the
Paris Conference of 1919 that convened to arrange post-war settlements, for eastern
Anatolia including Diyarbakır and Mosul, which were rejected by the British delegation.
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The  emergence  of  Western-oriented nation-states  in  Turkey  and Iran in  the  1920s,
under the leadership of M. Kemal Atatürk and Reza Shah Pahlavi, facilitated further
cooperation between the two countries. The rise of secular and nationalist regimes in
both  countries  narrowed  the  dominance  of  sectarian  differences  between  the  two.
However,  the  rise  of  nationalism  in  both  countries  unleashed  a  new  challenge  in
bilateral relations: the question of ethnicities or nationalities. Especially, in parallel to
the rise of Pan-Turkism at the turn of the century, although it was curbed by Kemalist
Turkey, some Turkish nationalists paid particular attention to the cause of ‘the Iranian
Turks,’  which heightened Iran’s  security  concerns.  On the  other  hand,  the  Kurdish
uprisings across the Turkish-Iranian border that had begun in the 1920s, and Iranian
government’s  lenience  towards  the  Kurdish militants,  discomforted Turkish leaders
with relation to Iran.8 Nonetheless, the two countries under the leadership of Atatürk
and Reza Shah overcame the challenges and developed a good neighbourly affiliation.
Having  consolidated  their  political  regimes,  Ankara  and  Tehran  demarcated  their
borders,  and  signed  a  friendship  agreement.  Reza  Shah’s  visit  to  Turkey  in  1934
displayed the growing friendly relationship between the two countries. First of all, both
leaders  denounced  both  the  imperialist  and  sectarian  claims  of  their  predecessors.
Instead,  they  were  primarily  preoccupied  with  building  nations  and  modern  states
across  their  respective  territories.  Additionally,  the  British influence  in  the  Middle
East, and the Soviet control over the Caucasus, deterred Turkey and Iran from reviving
expansionist claims, and left them as ‘status quo powers’ committed to preserving their
sovereignty and territorial integrity. A series of tribal revolts on the frontiers of both
countries led them, alongside Afghanistan and Iraq, to sign a non-aggression (Sadabad)
treaty. Accordingly, the parties agreed to prevent in their respective territories ‘the
formation and activities of armed bands, associations or organisations to subvert the
established institutions, or disturb the order or security of any part, whether situated
on  the  frontier  or  elsewhere,  of  the  territory  of  another  Party,  or  to  change  the
constitutional system of such other Party.’9
Amicable  relations  between  the  two  countries  were  furthered  after  WWII.  As  an
illustration  of  good-neighbourly  relations,  an  Iran-Turkey  Friendship  Society  was
established in Istanbul in late 1952. Turkish President Celal Bayar visited Tehran in
September 1955, which was reciprocated by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s visit to
Ankara in May 1956. At that time, the perceived Soviet threat and the fear of the spread
of communism led both Turkey and Iran to enter security relations with the United
States. As the two leading US allies in the Middle East, Turkey and Iran headed the
establishment  of  the  Baghdad  Pact  in  1955,  which  later  turned  into  CENTO.
Additionally,  both  countries,  alongside  Pakistan,  established  the  Organisation  for
Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in 1964.10 That period was one of the most
brilliant for Turkish-Iranian relations. In addition to political and security affiliations,
economic and cultural relations between the two countries considerably improved. The
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two  countries  abolished  visa  requirements  for  travel  purposes,  signed  a  trade
agreement,  and  engaged  in  connecting  their  railways  and  highways  within  the
framework of RCD. Ankara and Tehran signed a cultural cooperation agreement in 1959
that came into force in 1966. Accordingly, the Iranian Cultural House was opened in
Ankara, and academic exchange programs were launched between the two countries.
The  Turkish  postal  agency  issued  special  stamps  to  celebrate  the  so-called  ‘2500th
Anniversary of the Iranian Monarchy’s Foundation’ in 1971 that highlighted the close
relationship between Ankara and Tehran. Despite the growing ties between the two
countries, Turkey-Iran relations failed to turn into a full-fledged partnership, either
because  of  the  different  geostrategic  priorities  of  both  capitals,  or  an  underlying
mistrust between the leaders. Moreover, domestic turmoil in respective countries in
the late 1970s prevented them from furthering their ties.11 Ostensible attempts of the
parties to develop economic and trade ties between the two countries failed to produce
a breakthrough. In addition to the structural characteristics of the economies of Turkey
and  Iran,  substitute  import  development  programs of  both  parties  prevented  the
development of trade relations, aside from the logistical transitionary role of Turkey to
connect Iran and Europe. After the rise of oil prices in the mid-1970s, the volume of
trade between Turkey and Iran slightly increased in favour of Iran.12 Even then, the
total amount of trade between the two countries remained at negligible levels, i.e. less
than fifty million dollars.13
By  the  late  1970s,  when  the  Pahlavi  monarchy  was overthrown  by  the  ‘Islamic’
revolution, it was difficult to discern continuing patterns of accord between Iran and
Turkey. In a quick review of five hundred years of bilateral relations between the two
nations in order to trace continuity and change in Turkish-Iranian relations, one could
find,  at  best,  a  complicated relationship.  This  history of  a  complicated relationship
denies both the myth of continuous confrontation that dates back to the Chalderan
battle,  and the myth of eternal Turkish-Iranian amity that dates back to the Qasr-e
Shirin  treaty.  That  is,  the  history  of  bilateral  relations  between  Turkey  and  Iran
revolved around a ‘fine line between friendly competition and fierce
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Turkey-Iran Relations after the
Islamic Revolution of 1979
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran constituted a turning point in Turkish-Iranian
relations.  Immediately  after  the  revolution,  new  Iranian  leaders  declared  Iran’s
withdrawal from CENTO. Thus, the revolution did not only come up with dissolution of
that alliance, but also positioned Turkey and Iran against each other. First of all,  in
terms  of  its  political  regime,  its  commitment  to  secularism  and  foreign  policy
orientation,  Turkey  represented  what  the  revolutionaries  opposed  in  Iran,  where
‘fundamentalist Islamists’ led by a group of clerics under the leadership of Ayatollah
Khomeini seized power. Soon after, they proclaimed the Islamic Republic and engaged
in reversing the Pahlavi ‘reforms’ towards secularism and Westernisation. Hence, while
the two countries were proceeding towards different, or contradictory directions an
important pillar of the previous Turkish-Iranian proximity was destroyed. Secondly,
Turkey  was  still  a  close  ally  of  the  United  States  in  contrast  to  the  rise  of  anti-
Americanism in revolutionary Iran. Whilst the US-Iran relations were heading towards
direct confrontation between Tehran and Washington, particularly after the hostage
crisis, the alliance between Washington and Ankara was strengthened after the military
coup d’état of 1980 in Turkey. The close relations between the United States and Turkey
were perceived as a potential threat by the revolutionary Iran. Moreover, Iran viewed
the coup as an attempt against the Islamic Revolution. Thirdly, the threat of the spread
of revolution was alarming for Turkey. Revolutionary Iran was committed to export its
revolution  to  neighbouring  countries  for  strategic  and  idealist  reasons.  Ayatollah
Khomeini  called  on  neighbouring  nations  to  revolt  against  their  despotic  regimes
supported  by  the  United  States  and establish  Islamic  governments.  Khomeini’s  call
alarmed rulers  of  the adjacent countries  including the Turkish elite.  Moreover,  the
early  1980s  witnessed the rise  of  militant  Islamists  in  Turkey,  some of  whom were
highly  sympathetic  to  the  Islamic  revolution  in  Iran.  For  this  reason,  the  Turkish
authorities  watched  the  activities  of  Islamist  groups  and  their  relations  with  Iran,
apprehensively.  Finally,  many  people  that  opposed  the  revolution  in  Iran  fled  the
country,  some  of  whom  found  shelter  in  Turkey.  The  Islamic  regime  in  Iran  was
displeased with the ‘counter-revolutionaries’ that found refuge at the next door.
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On the other hand, conventional Turkish concerns with regard to the prospective fall of
Iran  to  communism  or  to  the  Soviet  sphere  of  influence,  constrained  Turkey’s
responses to the revolution.15 Turkey prioritised maintaining stability with Iran and its
territorial integrity. Additionally, Turkey was desperately in need of oil at affordable
prices, and hence, eager to develop economic ties with its neighbour. Consequently, the
Turkish  government  immediately  recognised  the  new  regime  and  Turkish  foreign
minister of the time, Gündüz Ökçün visited Tehran in June 1979.16 
The economic motivation of both Turkey and Iran for improving their relations were
enhanced  throughout  the  1980s.  Turkey  adopted  an  export-oriented  development
strategy and searched for valuable markets, whereas Iran suffered from the flight of a
considerable amount of international capital and from Western economic sanctions.
Moreover, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war compelled both countries to improve their
trade ties with Turkey in order to ensure deliverance of basic goods. The then Turkish
deputy prime minister Turgut Özal, accompanied by a crowd of businessmen visited
Tehran in March 1982. They concluded a barter trade agreement that envisaged Iranian
oil  supply in return for wheat,  dairy products,  and poultry.  Subsequently,  the then
prime minister Bülent Ulusu paid an official visit to Iran in August 1982, when the two
countries agreed to establish joint economic commission in order to promote bilateral
trade relations and address potential problems. Later on, the two countries revived the
dormant RCD, and turned it  into Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) in 1985.
Thus, the annual trade volume between the two countries amounted to two billion US
dollars in the mid-1980s.17 Iran then became the second largest oil supplier for Turkish
market (after Iraq).
In the 1980s the Kurdish question posed a new challenge for Turkish-Iranian relations.
Initially, Turkey watched apprehensively at the growing military partnership between
the Iraqi Kurdish parties and Iran, against Iraq. Moreover, instability in the north of
Iraq  as  part  of  Kurdish  fight  against  Baghdad  helped  the  PKK  Kurdish  separatist
movement, to settle there and wage armed attacks inside Turkey. The Kurdish parties
that were supported by Iran, particularly the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) had
close relations with the PKK, and Iran had reportedly allowed the activities of the PKK
inside Iranian territories. In order to alleviate the security concerns of both parties,
Ankara and Tehran signed a security protocol in 1984. Accordingly, the parties assured
each  other  they  would  prevent  the  activities  of  any  group  or  movement  that
threatened security of the other.18
The  adverse  effects  of  the  ideological  discrepancy  between  the  Islamic  Republican
regime in Iran and the western-oriented, secular Turkish republic haunted the bilateral
relations of the two countries towards the late 1980s.19 In particular, the censures of
Iranian leaders with respect to the prevalence of secularism in Turkey and its Western-
orientation, in addition to its alliance with the United States were widely circulated in
the Turkish media. In return, Turkish officials heavily reprimanded the Iranian regime
and its own orientation, which led to a verbal quarrel through the media between the
two countries. Additionally, the statements of Iranian officials condemning a resolution
of the constitutional court that confirmed ban on hijab in Turkish universities, were
viewed by Turkish elite as the Iranian interference in domestic affairs. Additionally,
Iran was accused of supporting some Islamist movements in Turkey. Eventually, the
two countries mutually withdrew their ambassadors in 1989.
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The  tension  between  Turkey  and  Iran noticeably  escalated  in  the  1990s.  Firstly,
ideological confrontation prevailed over bilateral relations.20 In this period, ideological
tension  between  Ankara  and  Tehran  went  beyond  mutual  criticisms  against  each
other’s political regime through the media. There was a revival of Islamic activism in
the early 1990s as proved both by the rise of principal political Islamist party, Refah
Partisi, and the growing number of extremist religious groups. Moreover, some of these
extremist groups, like Hizbullah, armed themselves and started to perpetrate terrorist
attacks. It may be argued that Iranian intelligence used some Turkish Islamists in order
to  gather  information  on  Iranian  dissidents  in  Turkey  and  stage  some  operations
against  them,  and  to  attack  some  foreign  diplomats  in  Ankara.21 After  a  series  of
assassinations  against  well-known  secular  Turkish  intellectuals,  including  Bahriye
Üçok, Çetin Emeç, Turan Dursun and Uğur Mumcu, the Turkish security elite hinted at
Iranian involvement in these attacks. Confessions of the perpetrators of some terror
attacks  arguably  revealed  political  and  logistic  connections  between  Iran  and  the
militants.  Henceforth,  Iran  was  continuously  accused  of  supporting  radical  Islamist
organisations and terrorist groups in order to destabilise and weaken the republican
regime, which would eventually be replaced by an Islamist one.22
Secondly,  Turkish  security  concerns  that  deepened  in  this  period  led  to  the
securitisation  of  Turkish  politics  and  foreign  policy.  In  addition  to  the  rise  of  the
perceived threat from increasing Islamist activism, the threat of ‘Kurdish separatism’
and  ‘terrorism’  was  considered  by  the  Turkish  elite  as  major  threats  to  national
security. Increasing armed activities of the PKK, which exploited political instability in
the north of Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991 became a major security concern. As a
result, Turkish armed forces pursued comprehensive operations against the PKK both
inside the country and in the north of Iraq. The Turkish government then frequently
charged Iran, and Syria, of supporting the PKK activities.23 
Against this background, the opposing strategic alignments of the two countries across
the region amplified the security concerns of the two parties. Besides its close relations
with  the  United  States,  Turkey  intensified  its  relations  with  Israel  into  a  strategic
partnership  in  the  mid-1990s,  which  irked  the  Iranian  leaders  who  viewed  that
development  as  a  hostile  action  against  the  revolutionary  regime.24 In  return,  Iran
consolidated its relations with Syria and Russia, which equally disturbed the Turkish
elite.  In  addition,  Iran and Turkey crafted  alternative  ‘alliances’  with  rival  Kurdish
parties in the north of Iraq in order to control the region and contain their respective
Kurdish ‘opposition’ activities there. While Turkey developed good relations with the
KDP  (Kurdistan  Democratic  Party)  led  by  Masoud  Barzani,  Iran  maintained  a  close
affinity with the PUK led by Jalal Talabani. 
Finally, after the dissolution of the USSR, Ankara and Tehran engaged in competition
for influence over the newly independent states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This
competition  had  both  ideological  and  economic  aspects.  The  Turkish  government
presented its  political  regime, as a secular,  Western-oriented regime based on free-
market economy, as a model to be followed by the newly independent states of the
region. At that time, most of the Western countries led by the United States promoted
these new republics to adopt the Turkish model, against the ‘fundamentalist’ model of
Iran. For its part, the Iranian government was concerned with the rise of ‘Pan-Turkism’
in the region that was supported by the West, which would threaten vital interests of
Iran, particularly in the case of Azerbaijan which was very sensitive for Iranian security
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considerations. Hence, both countries rushed to improve their political, cultural and
economic relations with these republics. Another aspect of the geopolitical competition
over  the  region  revolved  around  the  construction of  oil  and  gas  pipelines  for  the
energy resources of the Caspian basin. Eventually a deal for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil
pipeline  that  sidelined  Iran  was  signed  in  1994.  However,  Iran  prevented  the
construction of any gas pipeline that would bypass Iran by shipping Turkmenistan’s
natural gas to Turkey and the rest of Europe through the Caspian basin, exploiting its
contested status.  By the late 1990s the newly independent states consolidated their
independence  and  counterbalanced  their  behaviour  towards  Iran  and  Turkey.  In
addition to the lack of adequate economic capacity in Ankara and Tehran to maintain
their competition over Central Asia, the revival of Russian influence in the region eased
Iranian-Turkish contention.25
The growing tension between Ankara and Tehran reached its height and turned into a
diplomatic crisis  in the second half  of  the 1990s.  Besides Mohammad Reza Bagheri,
Iranian  ambassador  to  Ankara,  a  number  of  Iranian  diplomats  in  Turkey  were
compelled to leave the country in February 1997, allegedly for interfering in domestic
politics.  Iran  retaliated  by  dismissing  the  Turkish  ambassador  to  Tehran,  Osman
Korutürk,  alongside  some  other  diplomats.  Ambassadors  of  the  respective  states
returned  in  March  1998.  Then,  mutual  accusations  of  involvement  in  destructive
activities against each other, and mutual denouncements of their respective political
regimes between the two capitals resurfaced in the media headlines. Eventually Iran
blamed  Turkey  for  violating  its  airspace  and  bombing  territories  inside  Iran  while
taking military action against the PKK, and captured two Turkish soldiers in August
1999  for  illegally  crossing  the  border.  Although  the  controversy  over  the  Turkish
bombardment  of  Iranian  soil  and  the  captured  soldiers  was  soon  settled,  tension
remained  high  between  the  two  countries.  Consequently,  newly  elected  Turkish
President A.  Necdet Sezer abstained from participation to the ECO Summit meeting
held in Tehran in June 2000.26 
As an extension of the deterioration in Turkish-Iranian relations through the 1990s,
economic transactions between the countries considerably decreased. Combined with
the  economic  crisis  experienced  in  the  respective  countries  and  the  decline  in  oil
prices, total trade volume decreased to below one billion US dollars per year from the
peak of  two billion in  the  1980s.  Another  factor  that  contributed to  the  decline  in
bilateral  economic relations was the cancellation of  the barter trade agreements in
1985 by Iran, which blamed Turkish traders for overcharging third party products to
their Iranian counterparts. Hence, Turkish exports to Iran remained at around four
hundred to five hundred million dollars between 1986 and 1992. The value of Turkish
exports to Iran further fell to below two hundred million in 1998 and 1999, while the
total  volume of  trade between the two countries was around six hundred and fifty
million in 1998.27 
Notwithstanding  the  rising  tension  between  Ankara  and  Tehran  cooperation  in
diplomatic, security, and economic aspects was maintained. Despite the rising tension
between  the  two  capitals,  they  preserved  diplomatic  relations.  The  two  countries
agreed  to  expand  the  ECO  to  include  Afghanistan,  Azerbaijan,  and  the  newly
independent  Central  Asian  states  in  1992.  Additionally,  Turkey  headed  a  new
international  organisation among the leading countries  of  the Islamic world,  called
Developing-8  (D-8),  which  included  Iran.  Although  the  effectiveness  of  the  two
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organisations is questionable, they facilitated frequent meetings between the member
countries and contributed to the improvement of relations among them. 
Security cooperation between Iran and Turkey essentially revolved around two issues.
The first was border security. As neighbouring countries, they were preoccupied with
joint efforts to provide safety and stability around the border and the struggle against
smuggling and narcotics. Cooperation between the two countries on border security
issues  was  maintained within the  framework of  the  border  security  protocol  dated
1937. In this respect they maintained ties between both high-level security officials, to
the level of local security officials.28 The second issue of security cooperation between
Ankara and Tehran focused on containing the threat of ‘Kurdish separatism’ that was
perceived  in  the  respective  countries,  and  was  heightened  by  the  PKK  activism.
Additionally, the activities of Iranian opposition groups in Turkey and some Islamist
groups affiliated to Iran emerged as security issues between the two countries. When
Turkish Interior Minister, Ismet Sezgin, visited Tehran in September 1992, Turkey and
Iran concluded a security protocol.  Accordingly,  they instituted the Turkish-Iranian
High Commission for Security at the level of the undersecretaries of interior ministers,
the joint security committee, and the security subcommittees.29 The ensuing security
protocols envisaged the prevention of activities of terrorist groups in the respective
countries, and their exploitation of the joint border. Another part of Turkish-Iranian
security relations was directed to impede the emergence of an independent Kurdish
state in the north of Iraq. The shared concerns of Iran, Syria and Turkey in that regard
led to a series of tripartite meetings in the early 1990s. The identical stance of Iran and
Turkey  with  regard  to  the  preservation  of  the  territorial integrity  of  Iraq  and the
prevention of an independent Kurdish State has been maintained. 
As to economic relations, the Joint Economic Commission that was established in 1982
continued to meet regularly in Tehran and Ankara respectively, and addressed major
economic, trade and transportation issues. The then prime minister Yıldırım Akbulut,
visited  Tehran  in  March  1990,  where  they  discussed  the  feasibility  of  transferring
Iranian gas to Europe through Turkey. Subsequently, the two states started to negotiate
on agreements for the encouragement of mutual investments and the prevention of
double taxation.30 In this regard, the then prime minister Necmettin Erbakan paid his
first official visit to Tehran in August 1996. On that occasion, Turkey and Iran signed
the twenty-five-year natural gas agreement. It was projected that Iran would supply
Turkey with ten billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. It was a surprise for the
United States, which tried to isolate Iran and threatened any third party for investing
in the Iranian energy sector. Erbakan was blamed by some pundits for this agreement
as an extension of his Islamist foreign policy. However, natural gas trade had been on
the agenda of the two countries for over a decade and the Turkish government deemed
the agreement  to  be  an instrument  to  meet  growing domestic  energy demand and
decrease its dependency on Russia. After almost a two-year delay, the pipeline to ship
Iranian gas to Turkish markets was completed in December 2001. The commencement
of the flow of gas coincided with the ease of tensions between the two countries, and
combined, paved the way for growing economic relations between Iran and Turkey.
The Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) and the Iranian Chamber for
Commerce, Industries and Mines and Agriculture (ICCIMA) agreed to the establishment
of the Turkish-Iranian Business Council in November 2001.31
President Sezer’s visit to Iran in June 2002 turned into a milestone in contemporary
Turkish-Iranian relations. On the sidelines of the visit, the first meeting of the Turkish-
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Iranian  Business  Forum was  held  with  the  participation  of  the  two heads  of  state.
President  Sezer  inaugurated  the  chair  of  Turkish  language  in  Allameh  Tabatabai
University,  and visited  Tabriz  as  part  of  his  program.  Sezer’s  visit  was  meaningful
because  he  had rejected attending the  ECO Summit  held  in  Tehran for  the  alleged
Iranian  support  for  terrorism.  Thus,  this  visit  became  the  symbol  of  a  relatively
amicable trend that Turkey-Iran relations entered into just  before the JDP came to
power in Ankara. 
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Turkey-Iran Relations since the
JDP’s came to Power 
The Justice and Development Party, an offspring of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) that
was led by Necmettin Erbakan, a pioneering figure of political Islam in Turkey, won the
majority of seats in the Turkish parliament in the elections held in November 2002 and
was entitled to form the new government. The JDP’s realisation of power in Turkey in
November 2002 is  widely regarded as a turning point both for Turkish politics  and
foreign policy. It is still  controversial as to whether it started a new era in Turkish
foreign policy, or it maintained wider changes in foreign policy strategy before it came
to power. In any case, the JDP’s rise to power coincided with major changes in Turkish
foreign  policy,  which  was  associated  with  ‘de-securitisation’  and  the  promotion  of
economy and trade.32
The Islamist orientation of the JDP leaders boosted foreign policy change especially
towards the Islamic world. Traditional Turkish policy which was solidly anchored to
the West and the preservation of status quo, arguably barred it from developing close
relations  with  the  Islamic  world  in  general,  and  the  Middle  Eastern  countries  in
particular.  In the name of  multi-dimensional  and pro-active foreign policy,  the JDP
government  spared  no  effort  in  improving  relations  with  its  Middle  Eastern
neighbours. The Turkish diplomatic and economic engagement with the Middle East
reached a point within a decade that triggered a major debate among the scholars and
practitioners about a ‘shift of axis’ in Turkish foreign policy. In this respect, the Turkish
government’s opposition to a new round of UN sanctions targeting Iran in June 2010, in
its  capacity  as  the  temporary  seat  holder  in  the  UN  Security  Council  against  its
traditional Western allies, was regarded as evidence of the changing Turkish foreign
policy.
Since  then,  a  vast  amount  of  literature  has  emerged to  explain  and to  provide  an
understanding of the change in Turkish foreign policy in general, and its relations with
Iran  in  particular.  The  bulk  of  the  literature  draws  attention  to  the  domestic
transformation of Turkey, underlining the declining influence of the security oriented
Kemalist elites in power, de-securitisation of political Islam and the Kurdish issue in
national  politics,  the  orientation of  new  Islamist  elite  that  seized  power,  and  the
growing  influence  of  the  so-called  Anatolian  tigers,  a  wide  number  of  Turkish
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entrepreneurs spread across various cities in Anatolia, on politics.33 A considerable part
of the burgeoning literature highlights the geopolitical changes around Turkey that has
both forced it to review its conventional policies, and provided new opportunities in its
neighbourhood.  Accordingly,  new  regional  geopolitics  combined  with  domestic
transformation inside the country has led to the rise of close relations between Turkey
and Iran.
While most of the literature focuses on the transformation of Turkey under the JDP
government in order to explain its new Middle East policies and in particular Turkey-
Iran  relations,  Iranian  rationale  to  improve  its  relations  with  Turkey  is  widely
underestimated.  Iran  was  keen  on  keeping  its  relationship  with  Turkey  on  a
satisfactory  course  for  several  reasons.  The  first  of  them  was  the  growing  Iranian
security concerns especially after the American occupation of Iraq in 2003. The United
States’  animosity  towards  Iran  was  not  new,  but  the  American  threat  became
immediate for Tehran after it deployed large numbers of soldiers in Afghanistan and
Iraq, in addition to its military presence in the Persian Gulf and adjoining countries.
The increasing pressure over Iran compelled it to stabilise its relations with Turkey.
Although Turkish membership in NATO has been viewed as a peril for Iran, in order to
counterweigh increasing American pressure, the Iranian government has paid special
attention to developing good relations with Turkey, and at least to ensure its neutrality
in  case  of  a  showdown  between  Iran  and  the  United  States.34 In  this  regard,  Iran
welcomed the worsening of Turkey’s close ties with the United States and Israel under
the JDP government. For instance, in his meeting with Erdoğan in October 2009, Iran’s
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei praised Turkey’s position on Palestine, which
he claimed advanced Turkey’s place in the Islamic world, soon after the famous Davos
walkout  of  Prime  Minister  Recep  Tayyip  Erdoğan  and  his  admonition  to  Israeli
President  Shimon  Peres.35 Likewise,  in  his  meeting  with  the  then  President  Gül  in
February 2011, Khamenei praised Turkey’s ‘independence against the West, keeping a
distance from the Zionist regime and supporting the people of Palestineʼ that brought
it ‘closer to the Islamic Ummah.’36
Additionally, Iranian leaders have viewed the JDP’s coming to power as an instance of
the rise of Islamism in Turkey, and thus wished to stabilise its relations with Ankara.
Successive Iranian governments have adopted a seductive approach towards Turkey to
reduce bilateral tensions, and increase cooperation in various fields.37 Finally, Iran had
an economic rationale to keep its relations with Turkey on a positive path, because the
latter has provided a favourable market for its energy exports, and a potential supply
centre for some basic goods.
Iran’s relations with Turkey have continued to improve in various sectors from security
to tourism in the decade and half  since the JDP came to power.  However,  Iranian-
Turkish collaboration has not been seamless over this time. Considering the diplomatic
engagements  between Ankara  and Tehran,  it  would  be  wise  to  divide  the  Turkish-
Iranian relationship into three distinct periods. In the period of rapprochement that
began in 2002 and lasted till  2011, they expanded bilateral diplomatic, security, and
economic  relations.  Additionally,  they  had  ostensibly  similar  views  with  respect  to
regional  developments,  yet  they  deliberately  avoided  introducing  a  regional
cooperation perspective to their bilateral relations. The second period, the period of
estrangement that covers the years between 2011 and 2016, was marked by divergence
and competition between the two parties especially on regional matters subsequent to
the Arab Spring of 2011, which coincided with a lapse in their security cooperation.
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However, Ankara and Tehran have maintained economic and diplomatic relations at a
reasonable level which culminated in the institutionalisation of bilateral relations. The
third period may be called the era of development of amicable relations that began in
2016. The JDP government appreciated the Iranian support for it against the futile coup
attempt in July 2016, and revised its foreign policy orientation. Then, in addition to
preserving their accord on the economy, they reconciled their differences on regional
issues and engaged in coordinating their regional policies and security strategies. The
fluctuations in Turkish-Iranian relations during this time could be traced through a
review of diplomatic and economic relations as well  as through the implications of
regional context on their relationship in the subsequent sections. 
 
Diplomatic and Security Relations
In the early years after coming to power, JDP leaders were cautious towards Iran. They
were careful  not  to  antagonise  the  establishment  in  Turkey by repeating the same
‘mistakes’  of  the  former  prime minister  Erbakan,  who was  accused  of  pursuing  an
Islamist foreign policy.  They were also particularly interested in developing a bond
with  the  EU,  and  avoided  irking  the  West  by  holding  back  on  developing  better
relations with Iran.  Additionally,  there was heavy pressure by the United States on
Ankara for forcing it to cooperate with the US administration against Iran and Syria.
Hence, the JDP leaders were careful in justifying their engagements with Iran by either
suggesting economic considerations, or arguing for integrating Iran into the regional
politics so that it would turn into a responsible actor in Middle Eastern politics. In due
time,  the  JDP’s  self-confidence  was  consolidated  through  its  successive  election
victories and its gains against the ‘military tutelage’ in the country. Additionally, the
JDP  government  was  gradually  frustrated  with  the  American  policies  towards  the
Middle East, and the EU’s inertia in processing Ankara’s accession negotiations. Thus,
the JDP government was directed and emboldened to improve its relations with Iran.38
 
Rapprochement
The  first  high  level  meeting  between  Iranian  and  Turkish  officials  after  the  JDP’s
ascension to power was held in January 2003, when Prime Minister Abdullah Gül visited
Tehran. The top issue on his agenda was the pending American military intervention
against  Iraq.  Gül  was  eager  to  prevent  a  war  with  Iraq  through  mobilising  its
neighbours, because of the potential adverse effects on the region. Iran shared similar
concerns with Turkey regarding the implications of the American intervention. Those
concerns were shared not only between Ankara and Tehran, but also by a number of
other  countries  in  the  region  and  culminated  in  a  series  of  meetings  with  Iraq’s
neighbours.
Following the American occupation of Iraq, Kurdish militancy revived both in Iran and
Turkey as illustrated by the upsurge of violence perpetrated by the PKK. Meanwhile,
the PKK formed a new organisation named the PJAK (Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan)
that was committed to pursue autonomy for Iranian Kurds. Utilising the same bases as
the  PKK  around  the  Qandil  Mountains  in  the  north  of  Iraq,  the  PJAK  launched  a
‘guerrilla  war’  against  Iran.  Tehran was also concerned with the American military
presence in Iraq which might turn into a centre for its hostile activities in order to
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force a regime change in Iran, and a prospective Kurdish state in that country. Hence,
the containment of Kurdish separatism and the PKK/PJAK activities became a pressing
security  concern  for  Iran.  This  context  paved  the  ground  for  growing  security
cooperation between Ankara and Tehran.39 
Recep T. Erdoğan, the chairman of the JDP, who became prime minister in March 2003,
paid his first official visit to Tehran in July 2004, accompanied by a great number of
businessmen. At that time, the parties agreed to strengthen their economic relations
and  improve  security  cooperation  to  fight  against  terrorism,  and  reiterated  their
commitment to the preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity. However, Iran’s closure
of  a  Turkish  company’s  (TAV)  contract  to  operate  Imam  Khomeini  International
Airport in Tehran, and the denial of Turkcell’s (another Turkish investment in Iran)
contract  to  operate  a  cellular  phone  network  in  Iran  shadowed  Ankara-Tehran
relations.  The  dismissal  of  large-scale  Turkish  investments  because  of  factional
bickering  inside  Iran  led  the  then  President  Mohammad  Khatami  to  cancel  his
projected visit to Turkey.40 
On the first official visit that Erdoğan paid to Tehran in July 2004, Iran and Turkey
signed a security protocol and stressed their commitment to regional security and the
fight against the PKK. Iran recognised KADEK and Kongra-Gel as new factions of the
PKK and ʻterrorist networksʼ.  Preceding this, the PKK had changed its name several
times in order to overcome international pressures. Based on this new understanding,
security officials on the ground who met regularly, started to share information on the
PKK/PJAK activities. Occasionally they staged coordinated offensives against the PKK.
Additionally, Iranian officials handed over some details of PKK members to the Turkish
authorities.41 Ahead of the meeting of the High Security Commission in April 2008 in
Ankara,  the  Iranian  deputy  interior  minister  in  charge  of  security,  Abbas  Mohtaj,
underlined  his  governments’  view  of  the  PKK  and  PJAK  as  ʻa  single  terrorist
organisation under two different  names.ʼ42 Although senior  generals  of  the Turkish
army used to avoid giving a picture of military cooperation between the two countries,
General  Ilker  Başbuğ,  the  then  Commander  in  Chief  of  Turkish  Land  Forces
acknowledged  in  June  2008  that  Iran  and  Turkey  were  ‘sharing  intelligence  and
planning coordinated attacks in the fight against separatists.’43
Security  cooperation  between  Ankara  and  Tehran,  however,  was  not  perfect.  For
instance, subsequent to the bloody PKK attacks in October 2007, Ali Babacan, the then
Turkish foreign minister visited Tehran as part of the Turkish diplomatic strategy to
secure international support for a prospective Turkish military raid inside Iraq in order
to  fight  the  PKK.  In  his  meeting  with  Babacan,  Manouchehr  Mottaki,  his  Iranian
counterpart, claimed that the United States and Israel were behind the rise of terrorist
activities,  but  avoided a  clear  backing for  the  projected Turkish military  operation
against the PKK. Instead, he argued that there were alternatives other than military
operations for the solution of the issue.44 
Nonetheless, Turkey and Iran signed an agreement for cooperation in combating drug
smuggling, organised crime, and terrorism in August 2008. The agreement, which has
provided an institutional framework for Turkish-Iranian security cooperation, includes
a  definition of  terrorist  activities,  the  exchange of  information and intelligence  on
groups and individuals involved in transnational organised crime, equipment and the
details  of  terrorist  groups  identified  by  the  parties.  The  parties  assigned  the  High
Security Commission to oversee security relations and update the list  of  commonly
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designated  terrorist  organisations.  The  agreement  also  included ‘joint  intelligence
activities for the purpose of the apprehension of members of terrorist organisations
and halting the activities of those detected to be operating in either of the countries.’
The parties also agreed on setting up a joint working group co-chaired by the deputy
minister of the Interior in charge of security in Iran, and the undersecretary of the
ministry of the Interior in Turkey, consisting of equal numbers of representatives. The
joint working committee was supposed to meet once a year.45
Erdoğan paid his second visit to Iran in December 2006. Energy relations and Iran’s
prospective place in the Nabucco project to carry Caspian and Middle Eastern gas to
Eastern Europe, were the leading issues on the program of the visit. In the meantime,
Iran’s nuclear program gradually came onto the agenda of Turkish-Iranian relations.
Once the JDP came to power in Turkey, it adopted a cautious approach towards the
controversial  Iranian  nuclear  program.  The  Turkish  security  elite  continued  to
consider a prospective nuclear Iran as a threat to Turkey and the region. However, the
government spokesmen recognised Iran’s right to have a peaceful nuclear program,
and asked Iran to  take the necessary measures  to  remove doubts  over  the project.
When the negotiations between Iran and the EU-3 stalled after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
came to power in Iran in 2005, Turkey attempted to mediate between Iran and the West
on the controversy over Iran’s nuclear program. With the encouragement of Turkey,
the  Secretary  of  National  Security  Council  and  the  chief  Iranian  negotiator  on  the
nuclear  issue,  Ali  Larijani  met  Javier  Solana,  the  chief  commissioner  of  the  EU  in
Ankara in April 2007. Turkey’s bid for the mediation progressed after Barack H. Obama,
who promised peaceful solution of the nuclear controversy through dialogue with Iran,
was elected to be the new President of the United States in November 2008. However,
by then, neither of the parties were willing to recognise Turkey as the mediator.46
Iranian  President  Ahmadinejad  visited  Turkey  in  August  2008.  However  due  his
reluctance to include paying homage to Anıtkabir, the mausoleum of Kemal Ataturk in
Ankara, as part of the official protocol, on which the Turkish elite were very sensitive
at that time, his visit was arranged as a ‘working visit’ to Istanbul, where he met his
Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gül, and Prime Minister Erdoğan.47 The parties signed
the aforementioned agreement on the struggle against narcotics, organised crime and
the fight against terrorism, and some cooperation documents on transportation, and
tourism. They also signed a joint declaration on enhancing energy cooperation. One of
the landmark features of this visit was Ahmadinejad’s attendance at the Friday prayers
in the famous Sultan Ahmet Mosque along with a cheering crowd.48 At a time when
sectarianism was put forward by some analysts as the new faultline of politics across
the  Middle  East,  the  participation  of  a  hardline  Shiite  Iranian  president  in  Friday
prayers in a mosque considered to be the centre of the so-called Sunni world, had a
symbolic meaning. Accordingly, Turkey and Iran did not allow the prevalence of their
sectarian differences over bilateral relations. 
The improvement of relations between Ankara and Tehran was illustrated well, when
the Turkish government congratulated President Ahmadinejad on the occasion of his
re-election to the office after a controversial election in June 2009. Despite the wide-
ranging challenges to the election results embodied by the Green Movement, Prime
Minister Erdoğan paid another visit to Tehran in October 2009, which was regarded as
evidence of Turkish support for Ahmadinejad. Actually, in an interview ahead of his
visit to Iran, Erdoğan called President Ahmadinejad a friend of Turkey. By then, the JDP
government had adopted a more pro-Iranian position with respect to the nuclear case
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than  its  previously  cautious  approach.  On  several  occasions,  Erdoğan  claimed  that
Iran’s nuclear program had no military dimension and blamed the Western countries
for adopting a hypocritical view towards Iran. Additionally, Turkey and Iran developed
similar positions with regard to regional issues.  Erdoğan stated that regional issues
could not be solved through the participation of  extra-regional  powers.  Instead,  he
suggested that regional countries should take the initiative and lead cooperation for
the solution of  regional  matters.  In turn,  his  Iranian interlocutors praised Turkey’s
increasing support for the Palestinian people and approach towards the Islamic world.
While  receiving  Erdoğan and echoing  his  opposition  to  the  involvement  of  outside
powers in regional issues,  Ayatollah Khamenei called the Western proposals for the
regional issues irrelevant. He added that Turkey and Iran should try to be amicable for
the solution of  regional  issues.  However,  the  main ‘esprit’  of  the  visit  as  stated by
Erdoğan, was the improvement of economic relations between Turkey and Iran. By that
time, the total volume of trade between the two countries had reached to ten billion US
dollars. During the visit, Erdoğan bid for the advancement of bilateral trade volume to
the  amount  of  thirty  billion  dollars  within  five  years.  In  this  respect,  Turkish  and
Iranian officials discussed the establishment of free trade zones and joint industrial
towns in border regions, the introduction of national currencies in bilateral trade, and
the  development  of  banking relations.  Additionally,  they  signed a  memorandum of
understanding confirming previous energy protocols between Ankara and Tehran.49
Turkey’s attempt to be a mediator in the nuclear dispute eventually yielded an outcome
in May 2010. Then, in accordance with US President Obama’s request, Turkish Foreign
Minister  Ahmet  Davutoğlu,  along  with  his  Brazilian  counterpart  Celso  Amorim,
persuaded  Iranian  nuclear  negotiators  to  accept  a  deal,  and  signed  the  Tehran
Declaration. The declaration showed Iran’s readiness to compromise on a deal which
envisaged swapping a certain amount of its low-enriched uranium stockpile with fuel
for  the  Tehran  nuclear  reactor  which  would  be  provided  by  the  Vienna  group.
However,  the  declaration  was  rejected  by  the  Vienna  group,  including  the  United
States. Soon after the Tehran declaration, the US administration evoked a new round of
UN sanctions (RES 1929) targeting the Iranian nuclear program, which disappointed the
Turkish  government.  The  rejection  of  the  deal  by  the  United  States  despite  the
declaration  achieving  virtually  all  demands  of  the  Western  countries,  Davutoğlu
argued, displayed the ʻhypocritical characteristics of Western policy that denied Iran’s
right  to  have  peaceful  nuclear  energy  while  turning  a  blind  eye  to  Israeli  nuclear
activities.ʼ  In turn,  both Turkey and Brazil,  then temporary seat holders in the UN
Security Council, voted against the resolution in June 2010. Meanwhile, Turkish-Israeli
relations  worsened  because  of  the  Israeli  army’s  bloody  intervention  on  the  Mavi
Marmara ferry leading a humanitarian aid flotilla to break the Israeli blockade around
Gazza. In combination, these developments heated the debate on the shift of axis in
Turkish foreign policy. To complement the picture for the critics of the JDP foreign
policy,  Turkey  opposed  attempts  to  name  Iran  as  a  potential  threat  within  the
framework of the missile defence shield program of NATO, in the summit meeting held
in Lisbon, in October 2010.
Against  this  background,  the  then  Turkish  President  Abdullah  Gül  visited  Iran
accompanied by a large delegation including businessmen, governors, and academics in
February 2011. In addition to his meetings with his Iranian interlocutors, President Gül
visited  Tabriz  and  Isfahan  and  attended  the  Turkish-Iranian  business  forum  that
discussed potentials and problems in economic relations between the two countries. On
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that visit which coincided with the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Gül called the leaders
of  Muslim countries  ‘to  heed the demands of  the people’  which was regarded as  a
support for the ‘revolutionary movements’ in the Middle East.50
 
Estrangement 
Ankara  and  Tehran  apparently  had  similar  views  towards  the  revolutionary
movements  across  the  Arab  world  which  stemmed  from  different  motivations.
However, when the waves of anti-regime protests reached Syria in March 2011, Turkey
and  Iran  adopted  contradictory  policies  towards  developments  there,  which
overshadowed their relations for some time. Whereas Turkey favoured and supported
the opposition movements, Iran stood with the Assad administration. 
In addition to their divergence in respect to the Syria crisis, Turkey conceded to the
deployment of an American radar in Kürecik/Malatya, 700 kilometres from the Turco-
Iranian border, as part of the NATO missile defence system. Actually, considering the
security  anxieties  of  Iran  and  to  preserve  good  neighbourly  relations,  Turkey  was
initially reluctant to that concession and prevented any particular reference to Iran as
the perceived source of threat. However, partly because of the growing pressure on
Turkey, and partly because of their differences in regional issues, Turkey accepted the
decision in September 2011. Together with Turkey’s active policy to support the Syrian
opposition  in  coordination  with  the  Western  states,  Turkish  decision  to  host  the
American  radar was  viewed  by  the  Iranian  elite  as  the  return  of  Turkey  to  its
traditional  pro-American  axis.51 Hence,  the  Iranian  reaction  to  the  deployment  of
American radar was very threatening. IRGC Airforce Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh
warned  that  the  radar  would  primarily  be  targeted  by  Iran  in  case  it  perceived  a
military threat. President Ahmadinejad claimed that ‘the missile shield was designed to
protect the Zionist regime.’ Despite the Iranian reaction, the radar, jointly staffed by US
and Turkish personnel become operational in January 2012. In order to allay Iranian
concerns related to the radar, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, paid a visit to Tehran in
January 2012, where he stated that Turkey had never considered Iran as a threat and
would not allow any attack on that country from Turkish soil. Likewise, Prime Minister
Erdoğan specified that the radar would be in the control of Turkey, and it might ask
NATO for the removal of the radar if its operation conflicted with the conditions of the
Turkish  government.52 However,  the  radar  question  continued  to  be  a  source  of
contention  between  Ankara  and  Tehran.  Subsequently,  President  Ahmadinejad
cancelled his planned visit to Konya, Turkey, to participate in the annual Shab-e Arus
ceremonies to commemorate Mawlana Jalal ad-Din Rumi at the last minute, arguably in
protest of the deployment of the radar.53
Meanwhile, the security cooperation between Ankara and Tehran stalled. Firstly, by the
autumn of 2011 it appeared that the two countries could not coordinate their actions
against the PKK and the PJAK in the north of Iraq. Turkish officials contended that Iran
had ceased to share intelligence with Turkey on the activities of the PKK. The failure of
security cooperation between Ankara and Tehran was illustrated by a mystery over the
seizure of Murat Karayılan, a PKK leader, by the Iranian authorities in August 2011.
Iranian  officials  however,  refuted  the  news  report  published  in  TRT,  the  official
broadcasting agency of Turkey, that claimed the seizure of Karayılan. In fact, Turkish
authorities claimed, the National Intelligence Organization had informed its  Iranian
counterpart  on  the  whereabouts  of  Karayılan,  on  the  Iranian  side  of  the  Qandil
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Mountains. Some columnists in the pro-JDP media then started to claim that Iran was
using Karayılan and the PKK against Turkey. As a matter of fact, the PJAK ‘unilaterally’
ceased its  armed activities  soon after  the Karayılan mystery.  In  Turkey there were
doubts and a reaction voiced by the then Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, who said,
‘there are wheels within wheels’ regarding the fate of Karayılan.54 
Moreover, the PKK mobilised its militants armed with heavy weapons and attempted to
turn the Şemdinli district of Hakkari province, located in the tripoint of the Tukey-
Iran-Iraq border, into a ‘liberated zone’ in the summer of 2012. The ensuing clashes
between the Turkish armed forces and the PKK militants led to a considerable number
of casualties.55 Turkish officials then reiterated their complaint that PKK members had
infiltrated through Iranian soil, which arguably showed Iran’s changing attitude vis-à-
vis  the  PKK.  Many  people  in  the  Turkish  media  and  among  the  security  officials
interpreted these developments as evidence of Iranian support for the PKK within the
framework  of  its  strategy  to  compel  Ankara  to  step  back  from  its  proactive
engagements in Iraq and Syria. To complement the picture, some Iranian officials made
statements asking Turkey to keep out of Syria and focus on its own internal affairs.56
Against this background, a series of mutual accusations and threats between Iranian
and Turkish officials were exchanged through the media. Erdoğan warned Iran that the
Assad administration was ʻgetting spoiledʼ  by the encouragement of Iran, and asked
Iran to withdraw its support from Bashar al-Assad. Likewise, Deputy Prime Minister
Arınç blamed Iran for pursuing a sectarian agenda and remaining indifferent to the
bloodshed in Syria. In return, Ramin Mehmanparast, then spokesman of the Iranian
Ministry of Affairs, claimed that Turkey was making a miscalculation with regard to
Syria. Seyed Hossein Hosseini Naghavi, a member of the Iranian parliament’s National
Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said; ‘The Turkish government bears the main
responsibility  regarding these bombings,  because it  explicitly  speaks of  arming and
sponsoring  paramilitary  groups  acting  in  Syria.’  Iranian  Joint  Chief  of  Staff  of  the
Armed Forces, Hassan Firouzabadi blamed Ankara for serving American interests in the
region and warned Turkey, ‘if they accept such a norm, they must then realise that
after Syria, Turkey and other [such] states will be next in line.’ 57 In response, Prime
Minister Erdoğan emphasised that it was Turkey who stood alone with Iran, and asked
the Iranian government to review its activities. At the height of the tension, Iranian
Foreign Minister Salehi visited Ankara in August 2012, in order to reassure his Turkish
counterparts on the Iranian governments’ view of Turkey.
In order to reconcile their differences, particularly on Syria, Prime Minister Erdoğan
met Ayatollah Khamenei in Mashhad, in March 2012. However, Khamenei reiterated the
Iranian position of support for the Assad administration and its opposition to foreign
interference  in  Syrian  domestic  politics.  Erdoğan  resolved  that  Assad  was  not
trustworthy and should leave power.  The Turkish-Iranian divergence on the Syrian
crisis remained a thorny issue in bilateral relations, and mutual accusations continued
through the media. For instance, Erdoğan, who was elected as the new president of
Turkey in August 2014, publicly censured Khamenei for his support for Assad, arguably
for resistance against Israel, although the latter killed two hundred and fifty thousand
people in October 2014.58 Subsequently, ahead of his planned visit to Tehran in April
2015,  Erdoğan  complained  about  the  Iranian  policies  attempting  to  dominate  the
region, and voiced the uneasiness of Turkey with those developments. Furthermore, he
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declared  Turkish  support  for  the  Saudi  military  intervention  against  the  Huthi
advances in Yemen, and asked Iran to withdraw its forces from there.59
Despite the row between Turkey and Iran with regard to regional and security issues,
economic  relations  between  Turkey  and  Iran  improved  considerably.  Turkey
challenged the unilateral sanctions of the EU and the United States against Iran, and
encouraged its  tradesmen to  enhance  their  economic  transactions.  As  a  result,  the
volume of bilateral  trade between Turkey and Iran amounted to twenty-two billion
dollars  in  2012.  Likewise,  Turkey  continued  to  support  and  facilitate  nuclear
negotiations between Tehran and the P5+1 countries (five permanent members of the
UN Security  Council  and  Germany).  In  this  regard,  Ankara  hosted  a  new round of
negotiations in April 2012, while Istanbul hosted numerous technical meetings between
the parties.
The election of Hassan Rouhani to the office of presidency in Iran in June 2013 boosted
Turkish-Iranian diplomatic relations. Rouhani’s ‘moderate’ approach to foreign policy
which valued diplomacy, cooperation, and constructive engagement was welcomed by
the JDP government in Turkey. Erdoğan paid a landmark visit to Tehran in January
2014. Turkish and Iranian governments agreed on the establishment of the High-Level
Cooperation Council (HCC) and signed a preferential trade agreement. While the long-
awaited  preferential  trade  agreement  was  supposed  to  boost  bilateral  economic
relations,  the  establishment  of  the  HCC  provided  an  institutional  mechanism  to
stabilise and strengthen different aspects of Turkish-Iranian relations. 
Subsequent to the establishment of the HCC, Iranian President Rouhani, accompanied
by a crowded delegation, visited Ankara and the parties held the first HCC meeting in
April  2014.  The  visit  of  Rouhani  was  marked by  the  conclusion of  ten  cooperation
agreements or memoranda of understanding in various respects. In return, President
Erdoğan visited Tehran in April 2015 to hold the second meeting of the HCC. The third
meeting  of  the  HCC  was  held  in  Ankara  in  April  2016,  with  the  participation  of
President Rouhani. 
In  spite  of  the  acceleration  of  high-level  exchanges  between  Turkish  and  Iranian
officials, their differences on regional issues continued to shadow bilateral relations.
For that reason, surprisingly to many observers, the Turkish establishment and public
opinion was divided in their assessment of the nuclear deal achieved between Iran and
the P5+1 in July 2015. Anxious about a deal that would supposedly make Iran more
powerful  and  aggressive  in  regional  politics,  a  great  number  of  the  elite  were
concerned with the implications of the deal on Turkish-Iranian relations. Conversely,
another  group  of  the  elite  welcomed  a  deal  that  would  purportedly  provide  new
opportunities in bilateral relations. The JDP government’s assessment was indecisive.
Reflecting  the  ambiguity  of  his  government’s  view,  Mevlüt  Çavuşoğlu,  the  foreign
minister, welcomed the deal but asked Iran to revise its role particularly in Syria, Iraq,
Lebanon and Yemen, and to cease its sectarian policies. Later statements released by
high-level Turkish officials repeated Çavuşoğlu’s request, and invited Iran to behave in
a responsible  manner  in  the  region  and  avoid  destruction  and  violence.  President
Erdoğan also reiterated his criticism of Iran’s regional policies in January 2016, that
aimed to expand its sphere of influence in the region by turning sectarian divisions
into violent conflicts. Turkish blame unleashed a counter-campaign from the Iranian
side that targeted President Erdoğan. Iranian officials criticised the JDP government for
fuelling  extremists  in  Syria  for  the  sake  of  overthrowing  Assad.  Iranian  media
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circulated some reports that claimed the Erdoğan family’s support for ISIS. The rising
political tension between Ankara and Tehran coincided with the rise of PKK attacks
inside  Turkey,  which  led  to  the  revival  of  discussions  on  Iranian  support  for  the
terrorist organisation. Moreover, many pro-government pundits in Turkey blamed Iran
for  supporting the PYD (Democratic  Union Party),  an offshoot  of  the PKK in Syria,
against Turkish security interests.60
 
Amicable Relations?
Although the nuclear  deal  of  2015 failed to  yield  any remarkable  improvements  in
Turkish-Iranian  relations,  certain  developments  in  the  year  of  2016  unleashed  an
unprecedentedly close relationship between Ankara and Tehran. Firstly, Davutoğlu, the
then  prime  minister,  paid  a  visit  to  Tehran  in  March  2016.  He  talked  about  the
significance of the interaction between Ankara and Tehran with reference to regional
matters, albeit that they might have different views and interests. He stated in Tehran
that Turkey and Iran ‘should not leave the fate of the region to extra-regional powers.’
One month later,  although Iran was  seriously  criticised in  the  OIC  Summit  held  in
Istanbul,  Iranian  President  Rouhani  visited  Ankara.  Rouhani  called  the  disparity
between Turkey and Iran with respect to the regional matters ‘minor differences of
opinion’,  and  emphasised  the  commitment  of  both  countries  to  strengthen  their
relations in all fields. Thus, a new understanding was about to develop between Ankara
and Tehran on regional issues. 
Actually, the call for regional solutions to the regional problems was not a noble idea
on the agenda of Turkish-Iranian relations. However, the JDP government deliberately
avoided  engaging  in  a  regional  scheme  exclusively  with  Iran.  New  dynamics  that
emerged across the Middle East subsequent to the Arab Spring, compelled both capitals
to  reconsider  their  regional  policies.  First  of  all,  the  landscape  of  war  among
antagonistic  groups  in  Syria  dramatically  changed.  The  opposition  groups  fighting
against the Assad administration failed to establish a united front. Furthermore, they
divided into numerous rival groups that contributed to the rise of extremist groups
reinforced by foreign fighters. Then, the Western countriesʼ concerns with the rise of
extremist movements replaced their preoccupation with a political transition in Syria.
Consequently, international initiatives that brought some Arab and Western states led
by the United States along with Turkey aimed at promoting a power transition in Syria,
faded  away.  The  divergence  of  the  Turkish  and  Saudi  policies  towards  regional
developments  and  Syria  after  the  military  coup  d’état  in  Egypt  in  July  2013,  the
reluctance  of  the  Obama  administration  to  take  the  lead  in  a  decisive  military
intervention  against  the  Assad  administration  despite  the  accusations  that  it  used
chemical  weapons in August 2013 and the stalling Geneva process that envisaged a
negotiated  transition  process  in  due  period,  strengthened  the  position  of  Assad.
Through the strong backing of Iran and militia groups mobilised by Iran, the regime
forces gained a strong hand vis-a-vis the opposition. The military involvement of Russia
alongside the Assad rule in September 2015 provided the military superiority for the
regime forces to recover most territories that it had previously lost to the opposition
fighters. However, the involvement of Russia in the Syria crisis relatively marginalised
Iran’s position, since Russia started to speak in the international arena on behalf of
Assad.  Moreover,  both  Russia  and  the  United  States,  which  deployed  some  special
forces in order to fight against extremist movements, especially ISIS (Daesh) in Syria,
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courted the PYD, and its militia force the YPG, an offshoot of the PKK in that country
which claimed leadership over the Syrian Kurds. Combined with the aforementioned
developments, both the Russian and the American interest in this Kurdish group that
seized considerable territory in the north of Syria, compelled Ankara and Tehran to
review their regional differences, especially with regard to Syria.
Secondly, an extremist group named ISIS (Daesh) that first emerged in Iraq after the
American occupation, swiftly captured vast territories in Iraq and Syria particularly in
2014.  ISIS  heavily  used  a  sectarian  rhetoric  against  the  Shiites,  declared the
establishment of an ‘Islamic State’ over the captured territories, and threatened both
Iran and Turkey. It perpetrated numerous terrorist attacks in the respective countries.
Thus, the rise of ISIS turned into a common security concern for both countries. In the
midst of an international and regional campaign to fight against ISIS, the leader of the
KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq), Masoud Barzani put forward an idea to
hold  a  referendum  for  the  prospective  independence  of  the  Kurdish  entity.
Furthermore, immediately after the liberation of some territories that were disputed
between Erbil and Baghdad by the Kurdish peshmerga from ISIS control, the KRG set
September 25, 2017, as the date of the referendum. The Kurdish bid for independence
drew the ire of both Ankara and Tehran which started to coordinate their efforts with
Baghdad in order to prevent the independence of the KRG.
Finally, the failed military coup attempt that was staged in July 2016 against the JDP
government  in  Turkey  became  very  effective  in  furthering  Turkey-Iran  relations.
Despite the misgivings between Ankara and Tehran for a number of reasons in the
preceding years, Iran extended its support for the elected government against the coup
plotters.61 While the Western countries were reluctant to even condemn the coup plot,
and busy with warning the Turkish government about emergency measures taken after
the coup attempt, the support that came from Tehran was very valuable for President
Erdoğan. Turkish-Iranian diplomatic exchanges were accelerated and paved the ground
for increasing diplomatic and security cooperation between them, related to the Syria
crisis and the KRG bid for independence.
Against this background, Turkey and Iran, along with Russia, established a trilateral
mechanism to deal with the Syria crisis. The growing cooperation between these three
countries  yielded the  first  results  in  the  process  of  the  armed  opposition  forces’
evacuation of Aleppo, the second biggest city in Syria, in December 2016. On December
20, 2016, Iranian, Russian, and Turkish foreign ministers met in Moscow and issued a
joint declaration. The Moscow declaration reiterated the shared commitment of the
parties for the preservation of the territorial  integrity of Syria,  and to fight jointly
against  ISIS  and  al-Nusra,  the  al-Qaeda  affiliated  extremist  organisation.  They  also
declared their willingness to be the guarantors of a prospective agreement that would
be negotiated between the Syrian opposition and the government, which inaugurated
the Astana process. Meanwhile, Major General Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, Chief of
the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Iran paid a three-day visit to Ankara in August
2017.  In fact,  since the Islamic revolution,  the security elite in both countries were
skeptical towards one another. Bagheri’s visit to Turkey marked the first meeting of
top  military  commanders,  which  indicated  that  the  relationship  between  the  two
countries  went  beyond  economic  and  political aspects  to  include  cooperation  on
military  and regional  issues.  In  September  2017,  Turkish,  Iranian and Iraqi  foreign
ministers  issued  a  joint  communiqué  to  proclaim  their  opposition  to  the  looming
Kurdish independence referendum. The Turkish Chief  of  Staff  of  the Armed Forces,
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General  Hulusi  Akar  visited  Tehran  in  early  October  2017.  Subsequently,  President
Erdoğan visited the capital of Iran to hold the fourth meeting of the HCC. Then the
high-level Turkish and Iranian officials gave strong messages for the development of a
security cooperation between Ankara and Tehran, and for their resolved opposition to
the  independence bid  of  the  KRG.  As  a  result,  Turkey  and  Iran  coordinated  their
policies  in  order  to  foil  the  KRG  bid  for  independence.  They  also  revived  their
cooperation against the PKK. The Iran-Turkey High Border Commission met in April
2018,  after  a  six-year interval.  The Joint  Working Group that  was envisaged by the
Security Cooperation agreement of 2008, was activated and the parties met regularly
after 2016. At the end of the third meeting of the joint working group, Iran and Turkey
agreed to coordinate joint operations against terrorist organisations.62 
While Turkey was enhancing its relationships with Iran, and Russia, Turkish-American
relations  continued  to  deteriorate  even  after  Donald  Trump came to  power  in  the
United  States.  The  successive  American  administrations  rejected  persistent  Turkish
demands for the repatriation of Fethullah Gülen, the alleged leader of the failed coup
attempt,  who  has  stayed  in  Pennsylvania  for  many  years.  Additionally,  the  Trump
administration maintained its predecessor’s policy to support the PYD/YPG in Syria,
against  Turkish  warnings  and  security  concerns.  In  this  context,  President  Trump
decided to withdraw his country from the nuclear deal and initiated new sanctions
against Iran. President Erdoğan censured Trump’s decision and renewed his opposition
to unilateral American sanctions. In reaction to Trump’s decision and for the first time,
Erdoğan  named  Iran ‘both  a  neighbour  and  a  strategic  partner.’63 Likewise,  in  his
meeting  with  Iranian  President  Rouhani  in  December  2018,  Erdoğan  said,  ‘Turkey
considers  Iran’s  security  and  stability  as  its  own  security  and  stability,’  which




Economic relations between Iran and Turkey were driven by rising political tension
between the two capitals during the 1990s. The improvement of diplomatic relations
between Iran and Turkey since 2000 onwards eased the development of economic ties.
The foreign policy strategy of the JDP that prioritised economic and trade relations
played a considerable role in the improvement of Turkey’s economic relations with
Iran.65
The  main  motivation  in  economic  relations  between  the  two  countries  are  the
complementary  economic  resources  of  both  countries.66 Considering  Turkey’s
dependency on the imported energy sources of oil and gas, and geographic proximity,
its  access  to  Iranian  energy  resources  has  been  very  valuable.  On  the  other  hand,
through its large population and growing economy Iran has emerged as a promising
market for Turkish exports. Given the international sanctions primarily imposed by the
Western countries on Iran, Tehran has become more sensitive to the preservation of
economic and trade ties with Turkey. 
The annual meetings of the Joint Economic Commission that bring Iranian and Turkish
officials together have been held in Tehran and Ankara respectively. Additionally, the
Turkish-Iranian Business Council that was established in 2001 has served as a platform
that  brings  representatives  of  the  Turkish  and  Iranian  private  sectors  together.
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Turkish-Iranian  Business  Forums  that  have  been  organised  by  the  Council  and
promoted by officials in the respective countries have been meeting regularly since
2002.  Also,  local  chambers  of  commerce  and  industry  in  border  provinces  of  the
respective countries  have been organising mutual  visits.  MUSIAD (The Independent
Industrialists  and  Businessmen’s  Association)  of  Turkey  has  been  very  active  in
promoting trade relations with Iran. It has opened representative offices in Tabriz and
Tehran. Moreover, a number of business associations have been established in Turkey 
especially  to  promote  bilateral  economic  relations  between  Turkey  and  Iran.67 For
instance, Iranian businessmen based in Turkey founded TISIAD (The Turkish-Iranian
Industrialist and Businessmen’s Association) in 2001. Likewise, another businessmen’s
association  called  the  Association  for  the  Development  of  Trade  with  Iran  and the
Middle East was founded in 2009. Iranian entrepreneurs particularly interested in the
Aegean region in the west of Anatolia,  joined together to establish the Aegean-Iran
Cooperation Association in 2011.68 Finally, in order to boost trade relations with Iran,
the Turkish Exporters Assembly inaugurated the Turkish Trade Centre in Tehran which




Soon after coming to power in March 2003, the JDP government issued a decree to
promote cross-border trade by significantly reducing customs duties for agricultural
and industrial products imported from Iran, along with Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, both
countries modernised and improved shared custom gates in order to promote cross
border trade.70 At the same line, previously signed agreements on the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, and on the Prevention of Double Taxation were approved
and  enacted  in  2005.  Accordingly,  both  countries  assured  the  other  that  suitable
conditions  and  protection  for  investments  and  investors  would  be  provided.  In
addition, they signed the Preferential Trade Agreement in 2014 that aimed to decrease
custom duties on specified goods, which was put into force as of January 2015.71
Henceforth,  Turkish  exports  to  Iran  increased  considerably  from  less  than  three
hundred million US dollars to above three and a half billion in the early 2010s. Turkish
exports to Iran included precious and semi-precious stones; precious metals;  pearls;
coins;  boilers;  machinery;  mechanical  equipment  and  tools;  knitted  apparel  and
accessories; plastics and plasticware; wood and woodenware; motor vehicles and their
spare  parts;  electrical  machinery  and  equipment  and  accessories;  synthetic  and
artificial  non-continuous  fibres;  steel  products  and  textiles.  Almost  80  percent  of
Turkish exports to Iran consisted of industrial goods and machines, whereas 90 percent
of its imports from Iran corresponded to petroleum and natural gas.72 In addition to oil
and  gas,  Turkey  has  imported  mineral  oils;  chemical-based  products;  copper  and
copper-ware;  zinc  and  zinc-ware;  aluminium,  and  aluminium-ware;  iron  and  steel;
fertilisers; plastics and plasticware from Iran.
 
Energy
The paramount share of Iran’s energy exports to Turkey makes the Turkish-Iranian
annual trade volume sensitive to the fluctuations in international crude oil prices. The
rising crude prices were reflected in the rise of the value of Turkish imports, whereas
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dramatic falls in crude prices noticeably decreased the worth of the total trade volume.
For instance, while the average crude prices were above the level of one hundred US
dollars per barrel throughout 2011 to 2013, Turkish annual imports from Iran were
valued at over ten billion dollars, which resulted in high trade volumes between the
two  countries.  Meanwhile,  the  proportion  of  gold  in  Turkish  exports  to  Iran
dramatically increased after 2010 in order to counterweigh international sanctions. The
increasing amount of gold exported coincided with the high crude prices culminating
at the peak in Turkish-Iranian total trade volume, which was about twenty-two billion
US dollars in 2012.73 A year later, partly because of decreasing oil prices, and partly
because of growing constraints on Turkish gold exports, trade records returned to their
usual levels. When the crude prices decreased to a level below fifty dollars per barrel in
2015 and 2016, the amount of the value of the total trade volume remained under ten
billion dollars. It is noteworthy that primarily because of the declining oil prices in
2016  to around  forty-one  dollars,  the  balance  of  trade  between  the  two  countries
shifted in favour of Turkey for the first time in the recent decades.74 In that particular
year there was a considerable leap in Turkish exports to Iran which was boosted by the
implementation of the preferential trade agreement, and also affected by an increasing
amount of exported gold.75 Due to the volatile nature of the total value of economic
transactions between the two countries, their share in one another’s total foreign trade
records continuously changed. While at times, Iran and Turkey ranked within the first
five trading partners respectively, at other times that ranking has changed.
Energy relations between the two countries mainly revolved around the Iranian supply
of  gas  and oil  to  Turkey.76 Turkey’s  demand for  energy has  increased considerably
because of the growth of its industry and population. Turkey’s energy demand, which
was around 114 Mtoe in 2011, is expected to reach 237 Mtoe by 2030.77 90 percent of the
Turkish energy demand has been matched by fossil fuels (oil, natural gas and coal). The
share of gas in the Turkish energy mix has considerably increased since the JDP came
to  power,  because  most  of  the  power  plants  were  converted  to  natural  gas.  Then,
negligible amounts of Turkish oil and gas reserves made Turkey dependent on foreign
supplies. Russia has been providing around 50 percent of its natural gas consumption.
Iran is the second primary source of gas for Turkey.78
The history of the gas trade between the two countries dates back to the 1996 deal that
envisaged Iran’s gas delivery for twenty-five years with increasing amounts of supply,
which would ultimately reach to 10 bcm per year and the installation of a pipeline for
that purpose. The flow of gas through the pipeline began in late 2001. However, after
the start of the flow of gas to Turkey, Ankara and Tehran frequently disputed either the
volume, or the price of the gas. Turkey ceased gas imports for a while in 2002 partly for
technical  problems  and  partly  for  lack  of  demand.  Turkey  then  forced  Iran  to
renegotiate the agreement and subsequently secured a lower price. Additionally, the
volume  subjected  to  take  or  pay  statement,  was  decreased  from  87  percent  to  70
percent, which provided BOTAŞ,  the Turkish company that has the monopoly of gas
imports, with the manoeuvrability to decrease its imports by 30 percent of the agreed
amount, without facing any penalties.79 However, Turkey continued to dispute the price
which resulted in cuts in the flow of gas. On the other side, Iran cut off its supply to
Turkey allegedly for cold weather conditions in January 2006. Sometimes, the pipeline
was hit by explosions, arguably by the PKK attacks that interrupted gas supply. Iran
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decreased the volume of gas exported to Turkey in the early months of 2007 after its
dispute with Turkmenistan over gas deliveries and cold weather conditions. 
Disagreements between Iran and Turkey on the volume, quality,  and pricing of  gas
became paramount over time. Whenever bilateral relations were tense, disagreements
between the parties over pricing and some cuts in the flow of gas were presented by
some  media  outlets  as  the  Iranian  utilisation  of  the  ‘energy  weapon.’80 Due  to
continuing  disputes  between  the  parties,  the  Turkish  BOTAŞ  went  twice  to
international  arbitration against  Iran.  In  the  first  case,  in  response  to  BOTAŞ’s  file
against the NIGC (the National Iranian Gas Company) dated 2004, the arbitration court
awarded in 2009 an 18 percent decrease in the price of gas exported to Turkey and
almost one billion US dollars as compensation for previous transactions.81 BOTAŞ went
to  international  arbitration  against Iran  for  the  second  time  in  March  2012,  for
disagreements on pricing. Four years later, the arbitration court decided in favour of
Turkey in terms of price disagreement.82 The court ruled that Iran should cut the price
of exported gas price by approximately 13 percent, and ordered Iran to pay close to two
billion dollars to BOTAŞ for overcharging between 2011 and 2015. With regard to the
Turkish case against Iran for deficiencies in delivery, the court accepted the Iranian
arguments.83 
The Turkish and Iranian attempts to enhance their cooperation on gas transactions
however,  remained  inconclusive.  Iran  and  Turkey  signed  a  memorandum  of
understanding in July 2007 that anticipated that the Turkish public oil company, TPAO,
would develop phases 22, 23, and 24 in the South Pars gas field. Accordingly, a pipeline
would be constructed between the two countries; Turkey would use gas through that
pipeline at a discounted level, while a considerable amount of gas was to be exported to
European markets.84 Additionally, the protocol referred to the Turkmenistan gas which
was to  be  transited through Iran and Turkey to  Europe.  The American embassy  in
Ankara reacted against that protocol and warned Turkey not to endanger joint projects
between the United States and Turkey in other areas.85 Despite the American warning,
the JDP government seemed resolved to further its energy relationship with Iran. As a
supplementary  to  the  first  memorandum,  Iran  and  Turkey  signed  another
memorandum in November 2008. TPAO was expected to invest in the fields assigned to
it a total amount of US$15 billion in order to produce 20 to 35 bcm of gas per year,
based on a buy-back contract. TPAO was interested in starting its development work in
November 2009, a date which was delayed by both parties. Iran suggested a change of
locations  for  the  development  offered to  Turkey,  which was rejected by the latter.
There was also disagreement between the parties over the price,  while Turkey was
especially concerned with the buy-back conditions. Other issues that overshadowed the
project  were  regarding  the  terms  of  agreement  considering  Iranian  domestic  use,
Turkey’s concerns with a projected over-supply and their previous disagreements in
gas trade. Additionally the prospective transfer of Iranian gas to Europe was a daunting
task because there was no established pipeline, which led to speculations as to which
pipeline  project  between  Nabucco,  the  Trans-Adriatic  Pipeline,  and  the  Persian
Pipeline, would be preferred to transfer Iranian gas.86 Turkey entertained the idea of
incorporating Iran into the Nabucco gas pipeline plan that was projected to transfer the
Caspian natural  gas  resources  to  the southeastern and eastern European markets.87
Both the United States and the EU objected to the involvement of Iran in the plan. With
the intensification of sanctions over Iran, the feasibility of carrying Iranian gas to the
European  markets  decreased  considerably.  Consequently,  the  early  political  will  to
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further energy relations between Iran and Turkey failed to materialise, and they failed
to finalise the initial agreements.88
Turkey has been importing 90 percent of its oil needs. Having considerable oil reserves,
Iran  has  emerged as  a  potential  oil  supplier  to  Turkey.  Oil  trade  between the  two
countries has a long history. After the Iranian revolution in 1979, Ankara made several
oil-for-goods  agreements  with  Tehran.  The  oil  trade  between  the  two  countries
continued over time. Thus, Iran used to be one of the main oil suppliers for the Turkish
market. After the US sanctions on Iran were intensified in 2010, Turkey was granted
some  exemptions  because  it  had  considerably  reduced  its  oil  imports  from  Iran.
Nevertheless, Turkey continued to import gas at regular levels due to the take-or-pay
principle included in the relevant deal, and oil from Iran at dramatically reduced levels.
89 Despite  the reductions  in  Turkish oil  imports  from Iran between 2013-2016,  Iran
continued to be one of the two main suppliers, while Turkey ranked fifth among Iran’s
customers.90 After the removal of sanctions in January 2016, Turkish oil imports from
Iran increased to 21 million barrels in that year, and 52.8 million barrels in 2017.91
 
Investments
Iranian attempts at drawing international finance and promoting foreign companies to
invest in Iran in the late 1990s, opened a new opportunity in Turkish-Iranian relations.
Since  then,  a  growing  number  of  Turkish  delegations  of businessmen  and
entrepreneurs  interested  in  the  Iranian  market  visited  the  country.92 Some  of  the
Turkish investments failed partly because of factional bickering in Iran. Among them
the investments of TAV and Turkcell are worthy of mentioning. TAV won the tender
for construction of an international airport in Tehran (IKIA) based on a build-manage-
deliver contract. However, immediately after the operations began in May 2004, the
airport was occupied by the Revolutionary Guards ostensibly for the company’s alleged
ties with Israel. Subsequently, the TAV personnel were forced to leave the airport.93 In
the meantime,  a  consortium led by Turkcell  won the tender to determine the first
private mobile operator in Iran. Soon after the signing of the contract, a new legislation
by the Iranian parliament prevented its operationalisation.94 Then, President Khatami
cancelled his arranged visit to Turkey in September 2004. 
Notwithstanding the challenges, there are some success stories for Turkish companies
venturing into Iran. Gübretaş,  a leading Turkish fertiliser company bought majority
shares  (48.8  percent)  of  Iranian  giant  Razi  petrochemicals  in  2008,  which  it  still
operates.  It  is  regarded  as  the  biggest  Turkish  industrial  investment  outside  the
country.95 Subsequently,  Zeynep Özal,  daughter of the late Turgut Özal,  entered the
construction  sector  in  Iran  with  a  number  of  projects  worth  four  hundred  million
dollars,  including  the  construction  of  a  multi-story  shopping  centre.96 Additionally,
Unit International, a major Turkish company signed a 4.2 billion dollar deal with Iran’s
Energy Ministry in June 2016 to set up four natural gas power plants.97 Previously it had
completed the construction of the Rudeshur Natural Gas Power Plant in 2008.98 Hayat
Chemicals built a factory in Zenjan in July 2011 in order to manufacture baby diapers
and women hygienic pads.99 The Kuzu Grup, a Turkish construction firm, was awarded
the tender for the Maskan Mahr project, a large social housing scheme which included
the construction of fifty-seven thousand units in Tehran, in 2010.100 After the removal
of sanctions, the Turkish Kaya Group entered the Iranian tourism market, and with its
Iranian  partner  the  Eromi  family,  opened  the  Kaya  Laleh  Park  Hotel  in  Tabriz.101
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Recently, President Erdoğan noted that seventy-seven Turkish companies have one and
a half billion US dollars’ worth of investment in Iran.102
Iranian businessmen have also showed an interest in investing in Turkey. Increasing
international pressure on Iran has led some Iranian businessmen to turn their faces
towards Turkey.103 Compared to the 319 Iranian firms operating in Turkey in 2002, that
number  reached 1470  by  late  2010  and 2072  by  2011.  By  late  2017,  the  number  of
Iranian companies  operating in  Turkey had reached 4,624,104 however,  the  value  of
Iranian investments in Turkey remained low, around just one hundred million dollars.
105 After  a  series  of  meetings  with  Turkish  automotive  producers  in  search  of
partnerships,  Irankhodro proclaimed the signature of  a  two hundred million dollar
agreement with Hema Endüstri in order to jointly produce cars in Turkey.106 However,
they could not bring this initiative to fruition.
 
Banking
After the JDP came to power, it promoted the development of banking ties between
Iran and Turkey as conducive to prospective trade and economic transactions. In this
respect,  the Turkish government allowed Bank Mellat,  which has been operating in
Turkey since 1981 with three branches in Istanbul,  Ankara and Izmir,  to open new
branches  in  March  2004.  Additionally,  Bank  Saman  applied  for  a  license  to  be
operational  in  Turkey.107 Bank  Tejarat  and  Bank  Pasargad  were  also  reportedly
interested  in  entering  Turkey,  but  none  of  the  aforementioned  banks  had  opened
branches in Turkey by 2019. On the other hand, Iran did not allow operation of foreign
financial  institutions  inside  the  country.  Although  two  Turkish  state-owned  banks,
Halkbank and Ziraat Bankası, have representative offices in Tehran, they are not fully
operative in banking transactions. 108
While Iran was isolated from the international finance system under the sanctions, the
two  governments  gave  attention  to  developing  bilateral  banking  ties.  Halkbank
especially, helped with payments to Iran for its oil exports. Furthermore, it arranged
Indian payments to Iran in 2013. However, the Deputy Director General of Halkbank, M.
Hakan  Atilla  was  arrested  by  the  US  authorities  in  New  York  in  March  2017,  and
condemned  to  a  thirty-two-month  prison  sentence  for  helping  Iran  evade  the
sanctions.109 Since then, there have been some rumours hinting that Halkbank would
also be punished for evading the sanctions;  yet,  there is no credible report on that
matter. 
Additionally,  the  Turkish  and  Iranian  governments  have  been  working  on  the
utilisation  of  national  currencies  in  their  mutual  trade,  both  as  a  way  of  reducing
convertibility costs and avoiding the American sanctions. The first step in introducing
the national currencies in bilateral relations was taken in 2008. However, the bulk of
trade between the two countries was handled in US dollars, and euros. Eventually, the
central banks of the two countries finalised an agreement in October 2017 to facilitate
trade with national currencies.110 Accordingly, the Central Banks would have a certain
amount in the currency of the respective country with which to facilitate payments.





In  the  last  couple  of  decades,  Turkish-Iranian  economic  ties  have  gained  a  new
dimension with the rise of tourist mobility between the two countries.112 The number of
Iranian  tourists  visiting  Turkey  gradually  increased  from  around  four  hundred
thousand people in 2002 to almost two million in the early 2010s. Turkey is considered
to be the first choice for Iranian tourists going abroad. The growing number of Iranian
tourists has contributed much to the Turkish economy. Iranian tourists visiting Turkey
usually spend an average of seven days, and an amount of money close to one thousand
US dollars.  However,  the  Iranian  authorities  complained about  the  relatively  small
numbers of Turkish citizens visiting Iran. In 2016, the number of Turks who visited Iran
reached two hundred and forty-three thousand. Consequently, Iran became the sixth
most popular place for Turkish tourists going abroad.113 Turkish citizens ranked fourth
after Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Afghanistan among the five million to visit Iran in 2014.114
The removal of sanctions on Iran and the Rouhani government’s promotion of tourism
has provided new opportunities for Turkish businessmen, who have been considering
investing in Iran’s tourism industry by building luxury hotels. 115
Recently, either due to economic or political reasons, a growing number of Iranians
have  become  interested  in  moving  to  Turkey.  After  the  decision  of  the  Turkish
government to ease property sales to foreigners – the government decided to grant
citizenship to those foreigners who buy real  estate worth of two hundred and fifty
thousand US dollars in 2017 – Iranians have constituted a conspicuous number among
the  foreigners  who  have  bought  properties  in  Turkey.  Last  year,  in  2018,  Iranians
purchased more than one thousand homes and apartments, most of which were worth
between fifty thousand and two hundred thousand US dollars. Hence, the number of
Iranians living in Turkey with residence permits reached 22,457 in 2017.116 Additionally,
there are a considerable number of asylum-seeking Iranian nationals, estimated to be
around thirty-eight thousand people, who have been temporarily settled and put under
temporary protection in Turkey while waiting for the processing of their applications
to the UNHCR.117 According to recent news reports, the number of Iranians living in
Turkey as of 2018 was around sixty-nine thousand, which probably included asylum
seekers and students.118 Iran is among the top three countries, alongside Turkmenistan,
Azerbaijan  and  Syria  which  sends  students  to  Turkey.  There  are  more  than  one
hundred  thousand  international  students  studying  in  Turkish  higher  education
institutions as of 2018, among which Iranian students constitute almost six thousand.119
Corresponding to the rising number of tourist, student and business people transiting
between them, Turkey and Iran have agreed to diversify and increase the frequency
and  direction  of  flights  between  the  two  countries.  National  flag-carrier  Turkish
Airlines currently flies to seven different destinations in Iran, including Tehran, Tabriz,
Mashhad,  Ahvaz,  Isfahan,  Shiraz,  and  Kermanshah.  In  return,  Iran  Air  has  regular
flights to Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. Additionally, there are considerable number of
charter flights between the two countries operated by private aviation companies.120
 
Regional Developments and Turkey-Iran Relations 
While  Iran  and  Turkey  under  the  JDP  have  steadily  developed  and  maintained
diplomatic and economic relations, regional developments particularly in the Caucasus
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and the Middle East have posed challenges. The diverging geopolitical interests of the
two  countries  and  their  different  foreign  policy  perspectives  have  prevented  the
development  of  regional  cooperation.  Despite  the  emphasis  on  the  significance  of
Turkish-Iranian  cooperation,  mostly  as  part  of  a  diplomatic  courtesy,  they  have
deliberately  avoided  region-wide  cooperation.  Furthermore,  the  emerging  power
vacuum and ensuing instability in their joint neighbourhood unleashed a revival of the
so-called historic rivalry between Turkey and Iran. In this respect,  the Iranian elite
blamed Turkey firstly for Pan-Turkism to exert influence over the Caucasus and Central
Asia, and then for neo-Ottomanism that is arguably in search of reviving the Turkish
rule  over  the  Middle  East.  The Turkish elite,  in  turn,  blamed Iran for  dreaming of
resuscitating the Shiite expansionism of the Safavid Empire. However, the changing
geopolitical considerations of the respective countries particularly after 2016, helped
the development of regional cooperation between Ankara and Tehran.
 
The South Caucasus: From an Arena of Rivalry to Multilateral
Cooperation?
The South Caucasus used to be a source of geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Turkey
in the 1990s. Growing Turkish-Azerbaijani relations over time were alarming for Iran
because  of  its  fear  of  Pan-Turkism.  In  order  to  counter  growing relations  between
Turkey  and  Azerbaijan,  Iran  maintained  cordial  ties  with  Armenia.  Unlike  Turkey
which  shared  the  Azerbaijani  perspective  with  regard  to  the  Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, Iran called for the cessation of armed clashes and political solutions to the
conflict, without asking for the end of the Armenian occupation. Moreover, Iran was
economically  marginalised  from  that  region  as  the  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  (BTC),  the
winning project to transport Caspian oil resources to the Mediterranean port, bypassed
Iranian soil. Baku and Tehran had also conflicting claims on the maritime and seabed
boundaries in the Caspian basin. The tension between the Turkish-Azerbaijani axis and
Iran escalated to its peak, when Baku and Tehran confronted each other over maritime
borders and drilling rights on the Caspian shores in 2001. Iranian-Azerbaijani relations
continued to sour through the subsequent decade due to Iran’s growing relations with
Armenia, whereas  Azerbaijan  focused  on  enhancing  its  relations  with  Turkey,  the
United States and Israel.121 
The first decade of the JDP in power in Turkey witnessed the continuing competition
between Ankara and Tehran over the Caucasus, and Central Asia to some extent.122 As
an extension of the Turkish-Iranian rivalry, Prime Minister Erdoğan excluded Iran from
his (aborted) proposal for the establishment of a ‘Caucasus Stability Forum’ in 2008 that
would include Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia as a platform of dealing
with regional matters.123 Additionally, Turkey furthered its relations with the Turkic
states of Central Asia and Azerbaijan to establish a Turkic Council (Cooperation Council
of  Turkic  Speaking  States)  in  2009,  between  Turkey,  Azerbaijan,  Kazakhstan  and
Kyrgyzstan,  which  was  aimed  at  promoting  comprehensive  cooperation  among the
member states.124 Conversely, Iran engaged in establishing a platform that would bring
the  Persian  speaking  countries,  Afghanistan,  Tajikistan  and  Iran  together.  The
Presidents of the three countries held a tripartite summit in Dushanbe in July 2006,
which was followed by several rounds of annual summit meetings between the three
heads of states. 
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Despite their mutual misgivings and competition over the South Caucasus, Iran and
Turkey  along  with  Azerbaijan,  have  developed  a  trilateral  mechanism  in  order  to
overcome  latent  and  actual  points  of  concern  between  the  three  countries  and  a
trilateral cooperation and consultation platform. The first, and foremost aspect of this
trilateral  relationship has  been the maintenance of  a  logistical  connection between
Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, which is the Azerbaijani enclave surrounded by Armenia,
Iran, and Turkey. It includes a land corridor to transfer oil, gas and electricity to that
enclave through Iranian territories.125 The second aspect of this trilateral cooperation
has been the development and connection of transportation routes, both railways and
highways, with all three countries. 
The foreign ministers of the respective countries, Elmar Mamadyarov, Ali Akbar Salehi,
and Ahmet Davutoğlu held the first trilateral meeting in Urmia, Iran, in April 2011.
Davutoğlu stated that ‘the main goal of the trilateral meeting was to improve cultural
relations, increase travel among the countries and to develop new economic projects’,
and ‘to combine the potential of these countries’ in a vast area ‘spanning the Caspian to
the Indian Ocean and the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.’ The joint statement issued at
the  end  of  the  meeting  underscored  that  cooperation  between the  three  countries
would contribute to regional peace. Additionally, it acknowledged the right of every
country  to  obtain nuclear  energy within the  framework of  the  NPT and under  the
supervision of IAEA. The joint statement foresaw cooperation among the security and
intelligence departments  of  the  three  countries  against  terrorism,  organised crime,
drug,  and  human  trafficking.126 The  statement  also  predicted  the  ‘improvement  of
cooperation between the three countries in the areas of trade, industry, investment,
transportation,  communication,  energy,  tourism,  science  and  technology.’  In  this
regard, the parties agreed to form a trilateral  economic committee to examine and
review the means and potential  for  ‘signing a preferential  trade agreement,  easing
customs affairs, modernising border points, and establishing joint companies’ between
the three countries. Accordingly, they entertained the idea of the establishment of a
trilateral common market, which might serve as a catalyst for a common market for a
wider region. Additionally, the development of transportation routes has been vital to
the improvement of economic and commercial relations between the three countries.
While Turkey has been regarded by Azerbaijan and Iran both as a market and a gateway
for their products to reach European markets, Iran serves as a transit route connecting
Turkey to Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Hence, the issue of the linking of highways and
railways  of  the  respective  countries  has  been  continuously  on  the  agenda  of  the
subsequent trilateral meetings.127 
After the Urmia meeting, the Azerbaijani, Iranian and Turkish foreign ministers held
five more meetings. Despite their diverse alliances and foreign policy orientations, in
order to reassure each other, the parties repeatedly underlined that their territories
would not be used for destructive activities against each other. They also reiterated
their commitment to strengthen their cooperation in ‘the fight against terrorism and
extremism,  transnational  organised  crime,  narcotics,  arms  and  human  trafficking.’
Despite  their  expressed  interests  in  promoting  a  trilateral  partnership,  mutual
mistrust,  regional  rivalries,  sanctions,  and  other  obstacles  impeded  the  proposed
cooperation schemes.128 At the fourth meeting held in Ramsar, Iran, in April 2016, the
parties  adopted the ‘Trilateral  Sectoral  Cooperation Action Plan for  2016-2018’  that
would replace the Trilateral Sectoral Cooperation Action Plan for 2014-2016 adopted in
the previous meeting held in Van,  in March 2014.  They also decided to establish a
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Steering Committee at the level of deputy foreign ministers for political affairs, which
would  act  as  a  coordinating  body  of  the  trilateral  mechanism  and  ensure  the
implementation of activities listed in the Action Plan.129 
The last trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers was the sixth one, held in Istanbul
on October 30, 2018. In the joint statement after the meeting, the foreign ministers
stressed their  strong willingness  to  further  solidarity  and cooperation among their
people,  agreed  to  consult  each  other  with  related  issues  of  common  interest  on
different levels and platforms in international and regional organisations and agreed to
support  candidatures  of  the  three  countries  in  international  and  regional
organisations. They confirmed their commitment to ‘sovereignty, territorial integrity,
inviolability  of  internationally  recognised  borders  and  peaceful  settlement  of  all
disputes,  as well  as non-interference in internal affairs.’  The parties reiterated that
they would enhance their cooperation in the fight against terrorism, violent extremism
and  separatism,  the  struggle  against  transnational  organised  crime,  narcotic
trafficking,  human  trafficking,  etc.  Underlining  the  geographical  location  of  the
respective countries, they considered increasing cooperation for the development of
the transport infrastructure. In this regard, they underlined the significance of large-
scale projects for increasing interconnectivity between the three countries; underlined
the full utilisation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and the completion of Rasht-Astara
railway, projected to connect the Azerbaijani and Turkish railways, and the Iranian and
Azerbaijani railways respectively, and encouraged the parties to make use of the full
capacity of the ports for the benefit of the three countries. They also displayed their
willingness  to  enhance  commercial  cooperation  in  the  field  of  energy,  the
encouragement  of  the  establishment  of  a  ‘Trilateral  Business  Forum’ to  further
strengthen the economic and trade relations and create new opportunities among the
business circles of the three countries, advancing cultural and scientific cooperation.130
Thus,  Turkey and Iran have apparently managed to overcome their differences and
diverging interests in the Caucasus, and turn that region into an area of cooperation. In
parallel  to  the  trilateral  cooperation  mechanisms  between  Turkey-Azerbaijan-Iran,
Turkey is also involved in another, but parallel trilateral mechanism between Turkey-
Azerbaijan-Georgia  in  order  to  promote  peace  and  stability  in  the  Caucasus,  and
cooperation  between  the  Caucasus  countries.  Complementary  to  the  two  parallel
trilateral  meetings,  a  quadripartite  meeting  was  held  in  Baku,  in  March  2018  that
brought Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Iran together in a single platform.131 Although
there is a considerable gap between the ambitious aims underlined through successive
trilateral meetings and the results yielded, the institutionalisation of a mechanism for
dialogue and cooperation among the  respective  countries,  could  be  regarded as  an
achievement towards multilateral cooperation.
 
Arab Spring, the Cooling of Turkish-Iranian Relations and
Reconciliation
When the revolutionary mobilisation of the population overthrew age-old dictatorships
in Tunisia and Egypt, Iran and Turkey apparently shared similar viewpoints. However,
their strategic and ideological differences unleashed new competition between the two
countries.  Iran  had  been  overinvesting  in  order  to  cultivate  strong  ties  with  the
dissident movements in the Middle East. The Arab Spring that swept the committed
enemies of Iran aside from power both excited and emboldened Iranian leaders, who
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labelled the popular movements as  part  of  the so-called Islamic awakening.  On the
other hand, the JDP leaders in Turkey attempted to ride on the popular upheavals both
to promote its government-type as a good-working model, and to forge close ties with
the  ‘revolutionary’  governments.  Indeed,  the  JDP  strategy  was  successful  to  some
extent in terms of drawing the interest and favour of the new elite across the region. In
addition to Erdoğan’s celebrated visits to the Arab Spring countries of North Africa in
September 2011, Mohammad Morsi, then the newly elected President of Egypt, Rashed
al-Ghannushi, leader of the Tunisian al-Nahda movement that started to occupy a large
share of power in Tunisia, Masoud Barzani, President of the KRG, and Khaled Meshal,
the leader of HAMAS, alongside many foreign guests participated in the JDP congress
held in September 2012.132 Growing popularity of the then prime minister Erdoğan and
the JDP across the region was alarming for the Iranian elite, in whose view the rising
Turkish  activism  in  the  region  would  discard  Iranian  influence.  According  to  the
Iranian assessments, the promotion of the Turkish model hinted at the unfeasibility of
the Iranian alternative for the Arab Spring countries.133
In this  context,  the upheavals  which erupted in Syria in March 2011 turned into a
thorny issue between Ankara and Tehran. Additionally, contested domestic politics in
Iraq  preceding  the  American  military  withdrawal  in  December  2011,  tempted  the
further involvement of Turkey and Iran to support rival political groups. The Iranian
elite viewed the Turkish support for the Syrian and Iraqi opposition as an extension of
a strategy to increase its regional influence to the detriment of Iran. Turkey’s bid for
increasing  its  sway,  particularly  in  the  Fertile  Crescent,  would  reduce  the  Iranian
weight  in  that  area  because  it  required  the  removal  of  the  Assad  and  Maliki
governments in Syria and Iraq respectively that were allied with Iran.  Accordingly,
Ankara  cultivated good ties  with  the  KRG especially  after  2008,  and ‘exploited’  the
situation in Syria to increase its regional clout. In response to the JDP strategy of riding
on popular  opposition  movements  (some critiques  called  it  an  attempt  to  create  a
regional  ‘Muslim  Brotherhood  Belt’  led  by  Turkey  under  the  guise  of  supporting
democracy134) from Syria and Iraq to North Africa, Iran adopted a strategy to confront
Turkey in Syria, and mobilised all its regional networks to stop the Turkish advances.135
In fact, Iranian policy towards the Middle East has been far more complicated than just
preventing the rising Turkish influence, primarily because Turkey was not alone on the
long list of its perceived adversaries or threats. Moreover, according to some Iranian
critics, Turkey had returned to its conventional policy of executing its role designated
by the United States, which was again simplifying a further complicated Turkish policy
towards the Middle East after the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, in addition to the JDP’s
‘moral policy’ to support democratic opposition movements against the authoritarian
regimes, the initial harmony between Turkey, the Western countries and Saudi Arabia
at the outset of the Syrian upheavals, put Ankara and Tehran into contradicting blocs.
Hence, a fierce region-wide competition resurfaced between the two states not only in
Syria,  but also over Iraq and the rest of the region. Thus, Turkish-Iranian relations
entered  a  new  period  of  competition  with  its  strategic  identity  and  security
implications  which  resembled  the  sixteenth  century  Ottoman-Safavid  rivalry.  Both
countries  blamed  each  other  for  following  a  sectarian  agenda  that  would  further
destabilise the whole Middle East.  For Iran,  Turkey was pursuing a ‘neo-Ottomanist





Surprisingly  to  many people  who observed the  ‘staunch’  Turkish opposition to  the
sanctions against Iran and its  support for a ‘peaceful’  Iranian nuclear program, the
same Turkish government stopped Iranian cargo planes headed to Syria in March 2011
for  allegedly  breaching  the  terms  of  UN  sanctions  for  the  transfer  of  weapons.  It
reported  to  the  UN panel  for  monitoring  Iranian  sanctions  that  one  of  the  planes
contained military equipment that was banned by a number of UN Security Council
resolutions. Likewise, Ankara seized five Iranian TIRs suspected of carrying arms and
munitions to Syria in January 2012. Meanwhile, it was reported in some media outlets
that the Qods Force of  Iran deployed a spy network in Turkey,  some of whom were
recruited from amongst  Turkish citizens,  in  order  to  stage provocative attacks and
collect  secret  information.  Combined,  these  developments  were  viewed  as  signs  of
worsening  Turkish-Iranian  relations  mainly  because  of  the  growing  differences
between them with regard to developments in Syria.
The Turkish and Iranian divergence on the Syria crisis stemmed from the different
understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  people’s  protests  in  that  country.  In  Iran’s
assessment it was a Western and Zionist conspiracy against President Assad, however
Turkey viewed the Syrian opposition as part of the region-wide trend to resist long-
lasting authoritarian rules in the name of political rights. Once Turkey had failed to
convince Assad to initiate structural reforms to deal with the growing opposition and
violence in the country, it discarded him and promoted regime change policy in Syria.
In this regard, it hosted Syrian opposition meetings, facilitated the organisation of the
Syrian National Council, provided shelter to the Syrian army defectors and helped the
armament of the Free Syrian Army. Iran criticised the Turkish attempts to support the
opposition to serve the interests of the Western countries. Indeed, Turkey coordinated
its strategy with regard to Syria with the Western states and some of the Arab states,
which established a joint front called the Group of Friends of the Syrian People.
For  a  while,  at  the  outset  of  the  Syria  crisis,  the  JDP  government  was  engaged  in
persuading Iran to support its cause. In this regard Foreign Minister Davutoğlu paid a
visit to Tehran in August 2011, just before the Turkish government cut its ties with the
Assad administration. Likewise, in March 2012, PM Erdoğan landed in Iran after his
return from the nuclear security conference held in Seoul, and met Supreme Leader
Khamenei in Mashad. However, he failed to secure Iranian support. From the viewpoint
of Iran, Turkey was acting in an opportunistic way by exploiting the crisis in Syria,
blaming the Assad administration for the violation of human rights, and turning a deaf
ear to the popular demands for a change of regime. Moreover, through its increasing
support for the Syrian opposition such as facilitating its organisation and armament, it
was  directly  threatening  the  Assad  rule  in  that  country.  However,  for  Iran  the
maintenance of the Assad rule in Syria was regarded as the red-line, while the removal
of Assad from power was tantamount to the weakening of Iran’s regional position.137
Moreover,  some  of  the  Iranian  elite  become  anxious  about  the  potential  Turkish
activities, similar to its role in Syria, to instigate and promote opposition to the Iranian
regime. Hence, the Biennial Iranian Studies Conference that was held in Istanbul in
August  2012  was  smeared  by  the  Kayhan  news  headline  allegedly  for  being  an
opposition meeting that effectively deterred Iranian scholars from attending the event.
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The contradictory positions of the two states with respect to the Syrian crisis combined
with the Turkish-Iranian row over the deployment of the American radar in Malatya,
unleashed the aforementioned rhetorical brawl between the Iranian and Turkish elite.
Despite the exchanges of fierce rhetorical remarks, mutual accusations and claims of
overall confrontation between Ankara and Tehran, the two states have not positioned
themselves  directly  against  each  other.  Moreover,  there  were  several  instances  of
cooperation  and  the  search  for  a  common  understanding  related  to  regional
developments, especially on Syria.
Prior to his visit to Tehran in January 2012, the then foreign minister Davutoğlu gave a
public warning against the ‘growing signs of sectarian-based tensions.’ In order to allay
Iranian  concerns,  Davutoğlu  confirmed  his  government’s  position  that  Turkey  had
never considered Iran as a threat, and assured Iran there would be no attack on that
country from Turkey. In the same vein,  Iranian Foreign Minister Salehi assured his
Turkish collocutors in August 2012, to ignore the words of any Iranian officials other
than the Supreme leader, President, and Foreign Minister, who represented the official
policy of  Tehran.  Meanwhile,  Turkey arranged the release of  some Iranian citizens,
arguably IRGC members, held captive by the Free Syrian Army on Syrian soil. Similarly,
Iran facilitated the release of two Turkish journalists kidnapped in Syria in March 2012.
In April 2012, Turkey hosted the second meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian
People,  which excluded Iran.  The Iranian government also organised an alternative
international conference with the participation of representatives from twenty-nine
countries in August 2012, but did not invite Turkey. Despite the different trajectories
adopted by Ankara and Tehran related to the Syria crisis, the two states continued to
search for a common platform to address that issue. Upon the proposal of the then
Egyptian president, Mohammad Morsi, foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran and Egypt met
in Cairo in September 2012. The foreign minister of Saudi Arabia was also invited, but
he abstained from joining the meeting. The second and third rounds of the meetings of
the  foreign  ministers  was  held  on  the  sidelines  of  international  conferences,
respectively in New York in late September, and Islamabad in November 2012. On the
sidelines of the OIC Summit held in Cairo in February 2013, the Turkish, Iranian and
Egyptian presidents came together and called for the end of the bloodshed and conflict
in Syria. At the same line, in his meeting with Iranian President Ahmadinejad in Baku
in  October  2012  on  the  sidelines  of  the  ECO  summit,  PM  Erdoğan  proposed  the
formation of three alternating trilateral negotiations that would include Turkey, Iran,
Egypt; Turkey, Iran and Russia; and Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia that would discuss
the resolution for the Syria conflict.139 However, the proposed trilateral negotiations
did not materialise until late 2016.
The Turkish-Iranian disagreements on Syria mainly revolved around two issues. The
first  was the fate of  Bashar al-Assad.  According to the Iranian view, Assad was the
legitimate president of Syria and no one had the right to ask, or compel his withdrawal,
which was regarded as interference in the internal affairs of that country. Unlike Iran,
Turkey  claimed that  Assad  had  lost  his  legitimacy  because  he  used  lethal violence
against people without discriminating between armed insurgents and civilians. Hence,
Assad should not be allowed to remain in power, even for a period of transition, as
envisaged by the Geneva Conference of June 2012. The second was that Iran called most
of the opposition movements extremists and terrorists who had penetrated the country
as  part  of  a  conspiracy  that  was  fomented  by  the  United  States  and  Israel.  Iran
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supported  Assad’s  struggle  against  the  opposition  ostensibly  as  a  fight  against
terrorism, or resistance to international conspiracies. For that reason, Iran argued that
a practical solution to the crisis necessitated the prevention of the flow of weapons,
funds  and  foreign fighters  to  Syria.  Contrary  to  Iran,  Turkey  acknowledged  the
presence of  some extremist  groups fighting against  the Assad regime,  but  asked to
separate them from the legitimate and moderate opposition groups. In this respect,
some of the Iranian elite blamed Turkey for either supporting or allowing activities of
those extremist  groups.  In return,  Turkey became increasingly discomforted by the
Iranian mobilisation of Shiite fighters from different countries to fight in Syria. 
Turkey  also  had  some  misgivings  about  Iran’s  relations  with  the  PYD  (Democratic
Union Party), the Syrian offshoot of PKK, in the theatre of Syria. The PYD had built
some internal and external alliances with various actors in the name of protecting the
Syrian people from extremist violence. Its armed wing, the YPG, consolidated its grip
over  the mainly  Kurdish populated northern towns of  Syria,  and built  autonomous
‘canton administrations’, which later turned into the de facto ‘Democratic Federation of
Rojava.’  While Turkey was coordinating its  activities in the north of  Syria with the
Kurdish National Council, a front organisation of pro-Barzani parties, Iran relied on its
close relations with the PUK, and its alleged relationship with the PKK, that made for
burgeoning  relations  between  Iran  and  the  PYD.  Indeed,  there  was  an  apparent
sympathy in the Iranian media for the PYD. It was then claimed that Iran had brokered
an implicit agreement between the PYD and the Assad administration, which handed
over  the  north  of  Syria  to  PYD/YPG  control  in  return  for  the  latter’s  rejection  of
participation  in  the  Syrian  opposition,  and  to  stand  against  the  mounting  Turkish
influence in the area.140
Meanwhile, by the late 2014, extremist ISIS militants took over most of the territories
previously held by the Free Syrian Army and the Nusra Front, surrounding most of the
southern borders of Turkey. From then on, ISIS fired rockets onto Turkish towns across
the border. Kilis town especially, close to the border, was badly damaged by the ISIS
rockets. In addition, the International Coalition led by the United States, established to
fight ISIS in September 2014, started to provide military assistance to the YPG forces.
The PYD/YPG that had previously controlled three ‘cantons’, actually Kurdish enclaves,
in the north of Syria since the regime forces’ withdrawal in July 2012, established a
front organization called the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that included a number of
Kurdish, Armenian, Assyrian and Arab ‘parties.’ Ensuring the military support of the
International Coalition, i.e. the United States, the PYD/SDF forces swept ISIS from most
of the territories that it  had captured earlier,  and thereby expanded the territories
under  their  control.  The  expansion  of  the  PYD  seized  territories  stretching  from
Hasekeh to Afrin on the southern flanks of Turkey, amplified the Turkish government’s
anxieties  with  the  establishment  of  a  ‘terror  corridor’  as  a  cordon cutting  Turkish
access to the Arab peoples, which triggered its military response.
The military raids of the Turkish forces inside Syria targeting both the PYD/YPG and
ISIS positions caused more anxiety on the part of Iran. Turkey justified its incursions
through  the  presence  of  terrorist  groups,  both  the  PYD/YPG  and  ISIS,  across  the
border. Besides occasional air strikes and artillery shelling, the Turkish armed forces
staged two major operations, in partnership with some Syrian militia affiliated with the
Free Syrian Army. Operation Euphrates Shield which began in August 2016 was aimed
at sweeping ISIS forces away from an area between the towns of Jarabulus and Azez,
adjacent to the Turkish border. The second major operation, code name Olive Branch,
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targeted the  PYD controlled  Afrin  canton in  January  2018  and swept  the  PYD/YPG
forces more than 40 kilometres away from the border. 
The Iranian officials watched the Turkish military raids inside Syria apprehensively,
and labelled them an attempt to create a buffer zone in that area. In response to the
Turkish air  raids against  ISIS  targets  in July 2015,  the spokeswoman of  the Iranian
Foreign Ministry, Marzieh Afkham called for effective cooperation on anti-terrorism
measures and respect for the sovereignty of the Syrian government.141 Deputy Foreign
Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian warned, the ‘creation of a buffer zone inside Syria is
a violation of the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.’ Likewise, the hardline
members  of  the  Iranian  parliament,  including  Hossein  Naqavi  and  Nozar  Shafiyee,
blamed Turkey for supporting ISIS and then using it as pretext to fight the PKK and
create a buffer zone in the north of Syria.142 
The  insistence  of  the  PYD  on  building  an  autonomous  region  in  Syria,  and  the
development  of  close  relations  between  the  PYD  and  the  United  States,  however,
lessened the Iranian opposition to the Turkish military operations. Soon after the rise
of debates on the likelihood of a federal administration for the future of Syria in early
2016,  the  then prime minister  Davutoğlu  visited Tehran,  where  he  told  his  Iranian
interlocutors  that  they  ‘should  not  leave  the  fate  of  the  region  to  extra-territorial
powers.’ In a similar vein, the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, who met his
Iranian  counterpart  M.  Cevad  Zarif  in  Istanbul  on  March  19,  lashed  out  the  PYD’s
declaration of  a federal  region,  and said,  ‘They want to divide Syria.  With Iran,  we
support the territorial  integrity of Syria’.  Indeed, Operation Euphrates Shield began
soon after the exchange of visits of the Iranian and Turkish foreign ministers in August
2016.143
In response to Operation Euphrates Shield, the spokesman of Iranian foreign ministry,
Bahram Ghasemi argued that the fight against terrorist groups in Syrian territories,
should take place in coordination with Damascus.144 His criticisms against the Turkish
military deployment continued. In a press conference, he stated that the adoption of
any approach that defied the political authority of a country’s central government was
not acceptable. He added that the continuation of a Turkish military presence on Syrian
soil  would  further  complicate  the  situation.145 Turkey  deepened  its  military
involvement in Syria through Operation Olive Branch in January 2018. Some militia
forces affiliated to Iran, then supplied the YPG in Afrin and mobilised to stand against
the Turkish military march. The Spokesman of the Iranian foreign ministry reiterated
his country’s concerns about the Turkish military activities, the necessity of respecting
the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Syria, and asked for a quick end to the
military operations.146 
Although Iran was highly concerned with the Turkish military incursions, its response
was relatively moderate. Mahan Abedin, assessed the Iranian government’s position as
‘cautiously  supportive’  towards  the  operation.147 Indeed,  Ghasemi,  said  that  his
government expected ‘Turkey to remain committed to the Astana peace talks.’ Turkey
and Iran, along with Russia achieved a good level of coordination in decreasing military
clashes and promoting political solutions to the Syria crisis. Hence, Iran has not dared
to endanger the process by antagonising Turkey.  Additionally,  Iran has also shared
some of the Turkish concerns about the empowerment of the PKK affiliated forces in
Syria.  Although Iran and the Assad administration courted the PYD for a  while  for
various purposes, the growing relationship between the PYD and the United States has
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turned into a source of  profound concern for Tehran.  American officials,  especially
after Donald Trump came to power, have publicly stated on several occasions that the
primary aim for their military presence in Syria was to counter Iranian influence. Iran
subsequently  further  valued  its  cooperation  and  coordination  with  Turkey,  which
paved the way for the Astana process. 
 
Astana Process
Turkey’s  approach  towards  Syria  which  was  based  on  the  overthrow  of  the  Assad
administration, reached a stalemate by late 2014. Firstly, the callous activities of some
extremist  groups,  ostensibly  part  of  the  Syrian  opposition,  led  to  domestic  and
international criticism of Turkish support for the opposition. Secondly, the US refusal
to take military action against the Assad regime, even after its use of chemical weapons
in August 2013, disappointed Turkey. Consequently, the Geneva Conference which had
envisaged the establishment of a transitional regime in Syria could not proceed.148 In
the meantime, the initial partnership between Turkey and Saudi Arabia faded away,
after the latter’s support for the Sisi coup in Egypt. As a result, the Syrian opposition
fragmented into further smaller groups with different patrons, and lost some of their
strongholds.  Moreover,  the  PYD consolidated its  authority  in  the  northern Kurdish
‘cantons,’ while the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq turned into a serious threat to Turkish
interests. Combined with the aforementioned developments, the Turkish government
was encouraged to search for regional collaborations for the resolution of the Syria
crisis. On the other hand, the military involvement of Russia in the Syrian war theatre
to support the Assad regime, gradually marginalised Iran’s position in Syria. Both the
rise of  ISIS,  and the growing relations between the PYD and the United States also
emerged as major challenges to Iran. The spectre of sectarianism across the region also
tarnished Iran’s image across the Middle East.  Against this background, the Iranian
government welcomed the trilateral negotiations between Iran, Russia and Turkey, a
mechanism that was founded in Moscow in December 2016. 
In accordance with the Moscow Declaration of December 2016, representatives of the
Syrian  opposition  and  the  Assad  administration,  along  with  Iranian,  Russian  and
Turkish delegations met in Astana. By 2019, eleven rounds of meetings had been held at
expert level. There have been two tracks within the framework of the Astana process.
The first was the establishment of the de-escalation zones,  which were expected to
provide  a  comprehensive  cease-fire  between  the  belligerents.  In  due  process,  Iran,
Russia and Turkey were recognised as the guarantors of de-escalation, and formed a
joint monitoring body to enforce the ceasefire in the de-escalation zones. Additionally,
they agreed the deployment of Iranian, Turkish and Russian troops in Syria to observe
the conditions and violations of the cease-fire. The second track of the process has been
directed to find a political, ‘Syrian solution’ to the crisis. In this respect the parties have
been  engaged  in  forming  a  specific  committee  consisting  of  pro-Assad  and  pro-
opposition figures to draft the future constitution of the country and the transition
process. 
Besides  the  expert-level  meetings,  leaders  of  the  respective  countries  held  four
summits.  The  first  summit  was  convened  in  Sochi  on  November  22,  2017. In  the
aftermath of the summit, the Syrian National Dialogue Congress that consisted of the
representatives  of  opposition  and  the  Assad  administration,  was  held  in  Sochi,  in
January 2018, when the participants agreed to form a constitutional committee. The
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second summit of the Astana process was held in Ankara on April 4, 2018. At the end of
the Ankara summit, the Presidents issued a joint statement. It is highlighted that ‘the
Astana format’ was the only effective international initiative which helped to reduce
violence across Syria. Leaders also confirmed their ‘commitment to the sovereignty,
independence,  unity,  territorial  integrity  and  non-sectarian  character  of  Syria.’  In
reaction  to  the  US  military  support  for  the  YPG  under  the  guise  of  the  SDF,  the
Presidents  stated,  ‘they rejected all  attempts to  create new realities  on the ground
under the pretext of combatting terrorism and expressed their determination to stand
against  separatist  agendas  aimed  at  undermining  the  sovereignty  and  territorial
integrity of Syria as well as the national security of neighbouring countries.’149
The third tripartite summit was convened in Tehran on September 7, 2018. The issue of
Idlib was the burning question in the agenda of Tehran Summit. The Pro-Assad forces’
encirclement  of  Idlib,  an  opposition-held  northwestern  provincial  capital  of  Syria,
raised concerns in Turkey and some Western countries for a new round of violence
close to Turkish-Syrian border and latent effects of the flight of hundreds of thousands
of civilians toward Turkey. The presence of Al-Nusra forces along with some extremist
militias  in  the  same  area  made  the  question  more  complicated.  Based  upon  the
negotiations  between  the  parties  in  Tehran,  Russia  and  Turkey  signed  a  bilateral
agreement in Sochi, in October 2018, to preserve stability and a ceasefire around Idlib.
150 Although the  bilateral  agreement  between Turkey  and Russia,  which apparently
sidelined  Iran,  raised  some  concerns  in  Tehran,  the  Iranian  government  remained
committed to the Astana process.
At the fourth summit held in Sochi on February 14, 2019, a draft list of the prospective
members of the constitutional committee was on the agenda. Additionally, the three
Presidents addressed a wide range of topics from the maintenance of a ceasefire, to the
withdrawal of American troops from the northeastern part of Syria, to the return of
Syrian refugees, to the promotion of a political solution to the crisis on the principle
that the Syrians would decide their own future. 
Although they repeatedly stated their commitment to territorial integrity of Syria and
the maintenance of the Astana process, the Iranian and Turkish divergence and mutual
misgivings  have  remained.  For  instance,  the  Iranian  government  did  not  publicly
protest or censure the Turkish military troop deployment inside the Syrian territories.
However, as stated by Erdoğan, their declarations and statements hinted Iran’s anxiety
about the presence of Turkish troops in Syria.151 Indeed, in his remarks at the joint
press  conference  held  subsequent  to  the  fourth  trilateral  summit  in  Sochi,  Iranian
President  Rouhani  highlighted  the  ‘temporariness’  of  the  military  presence  of  the
guarantor states in Syria.  He reiterated the Iranian position that sovereignty of the
Syrian government should be restored ‘all over the country’, which implicitly included
Turkish military operation zones alongside the northeastern part controlled by the US-
PYD forces and Idlib. Iran’s promotion and support for Assad’s position disguised as
support for a legitimate central government, and its call for withdrawal of all foreign
forces from Syria, proved the continuing Iranian discomfort and anxieties related to
the  Turkish  military  presence  in  that  country.  In  return,  Turkish  officials  have




Turkey and Iran shared similar concerns with regard to the American intervention in
Iraq in 2003, which resulted in some sort of understanding between Tehran and Ankara
as  illustrated  by  several  rounds  of  meetings  of  Iraq’s  neighbours.  Soon  after  the
American  occupation,  Iranian  and  Turkish  interests  fundamentally  diverged  with
regard  to  the  future  of  Iraq.  Although they  both  continued  to  be  anxious  about  a
potential  Kurdish  independent  statehood  in  the  north  of  Iraq,  Iran  was  equally
disturbed  by  a  potential  Turkish  military  deployment  in  Iraq.152 Several  rounds  of
discussions  for  a  Turkish  troop deployment  in  Iraq  between the  United States  and
Turkey did not yield effective outcomes. Conversely, American forces in Iraq severely
constrained the Turkish military and intelligence activities in the north of Iraq
In the meantime, Turkey developed intimate bonds with the Iraqi Sunnis and clarified
its  position for  the establishment of  a  unitary regime and inclusive government in
Baghdad.  It  was  eager  to  ensure  a  strong representation of  the  Sunnis  in  the  new
regime. This attempt, however, was effectively understood by Iranians as its opposition
to the Shiite dominated government, partially engineered by Iran.153 Indeed Turkey was
concerned about the consolidation of sectarian politics and a growing Iranian influence
in Iraq that would make it subservient to the interests of Iran.154
Despite their differences, Ankara and Tehran supported the transition of power to the
Iraqi authorities. For a while, Turkey appeased the Nuri Maliki government in Baghdad
so that they agreed on the establishment of High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council in
2008. The Turkish government was then engaged in developing close ties with the Iraqi
Shiites as well. However, the Turkish support for al-Iraqiya list led by Iyad Allawi in the
parliamentary elections in 2010 created some disputes in Ankara-Baghdad relations.
Although al-Iraqiya list won the election with a slight majority, Maliki succeeded in
leading the next government by ensuring Iranian support, which strained Turkish-Iraqi
relations.  In  the  meantime,  Turkey  deepened  its  relationship  with  the  KRG  to  the
dismay of the Maliki government and Iran.
In late 2011, the confrontation between the JDP and Maliki governments reached its
zenith,  when  the  latter  ordered  the  arrest  of  Tareq  al-Hashemi,  the  Sunni  Vice-
President, alongside a number of respected Sunni ministers. Turkey provided refuge to
al-Hashemi and condemned the Maliki government for pursuing a sectarian agenda.
Due to the Iranian backing of Maliki, the Iraqi-Turkish row easily turned into Turkish-
Iranian rivalry. In late 2012, Iraqi opposition groups staged meetings protesting the
Maliki government, in which some activists carried placards favouring Turkish Prime
Minister Erdoğan. Combined with the JDP government’s apparent support for the Iraqi
opposition and the public sympathy of some Iraqis for Erdoğan highlighted Iraqi and
Iranian concerns with potential Turkish activities in the region.155 To complicate the
picture further,  Turkey signed a  landmark energy deal  with the KRG,  which would
facilitate its export of oil to international markets. However, because of the ongoing
dispute between Baghdad and Erbil over the utilisation of the oil and gas reserves in
the north of Iraq, the Maliki government reacted strongly against the deal. While the
Erdoğan-Maliki brawl was going on, ISIS suddenly seized Mosul, attacked the Turkish
consulate and took the diplomats and staff hostages in June 2014. Soon afterwards, it
quickly  marched towards  Baghdad.  Turkey blamed Maliki  for  fuelling  sectarianism,
which prepared the ground for the rise of ISIS. Turkish-Iraqi relations were normalised
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only  after  Haider  al-Abadi  replaced  Maliki  as  the  new  prime  minister  of  Iraq  in
September 2014. 
In  an  attempt  to  reverse  the  sectarianism  that  haunted  the  country,  Abadi  was
occupied with reaching a compromise with the Sunni leaders of the country and the
KRG. He paid an official visit to Ankara in December 2014 and restored Turkish-Iraqi
relations. However, the Turkish military activities in the north of Iraq soon turned into
a new row in bilateral relations. As part of the global campaign against ISIS, the Turkish
armed forces started to train the Kurdish peshmerga and Iraqi forces.  In December
2014, Ankara and Baghdad reached a conciliation for the establishment of a military
base in the town of Bashiqa, near Mosul, as part of the joint efforts to train the Sunni
fighters Hashd  al-Watani (National  Mobilisation Forces  aka Ninewa Guards),  and the
Kurdish forces.  However,  reinforcements  of  Turkish troops in  Bashiqa in late  2015,
drew criticism from the Iraqi government, which was arguably, encouraged by Tehran.
When Abadi asked Turkey to withdraw its  troops from Iraq,  ahead of  the expected
military  operation  to  liberate  Mosul  from  ISIS  control  in  October  2016,  President
Erdoğan  reacted  angrily,  confronted  Abadi,  and  stated,  ‘we  will  go  our  own  way,
everyone should know this.’156 
Against this background, the Iranian government stood with Abadi. President Rouhani
implicitly criticised Turkish activities in the north of Iraq as a ‘dangerous intervention’
that was not coordinated with the central government in Iraq. Indeed, as Ali Akbar
Velayeti stated,  for  Iran,  ‘Iraq  is  more  important  than  all  of  other  Arab  countries
[including Syria].’ Turkish military activities in Iraq were considered by Tehran to be
detrimental to the sovereignty of the Baghdad government. Considering the Turkish
nationalists’  claims  over  Mosul  and  Kirkuk,  Iran  was  especially  worried  over  the
Turkish military deployment so close to that area.157 
Meanwhile, the Iraqi government mobilised volunteers to fight ISIS, which eventually
turned into Hashd al-Shaabi (the Popular Mobilisation Forces, PMF), promoted by the
Shiite religious leaders. The Iraqi government also employed Iranian military advisors
to train and lead the operations of the PMF, which became effective in reversing the
advancement of ISIS and liberating some of the towns it had seized. Subsequently, the
PMF was blamed by some critics for sectarian violence discriminating against the Sunni
people  of  the  liberated  towns,  and  human rights  violations.  When the  Iraqi  forces
turned  north  to  liberate  Mosul,  the  Turkish  government  publicly  opposed  the
involvement of the PMF militias in the prospective operation. Turkey’s anxiety with the
PMF mainly  derived from two elements.  Firstly,  considering  the  critics  against  the
sectarian actions of the militia in previous cases, the JDP government was critical of the
employment of such a force for the liberation of Mosul,  mostly populated by Sunni
people. Hence, a potential sectarian contention might worsen the situation around the
city, and culminate in a change of the demographic structure. For that reason, Turkish
officials repeatedly called for preservation of the ethnic demographic structure of the
province. Secondly, Turkey viewed that organisation as an instrument utilised by Iran
to expand and consolidate its influence in the Sunni regions of Iraq. Although Hashd al-
Shaabi was nominally subordinated to the Chief Commander of the Iraqi Armed Forces,
in  reality  it  consisted of  numerous  autonomous militia  groups,  some of  whom had
direct affinities with Iran. Hence, on an occasion in April 2017, President Erdoğan called
the PMF a terrorist organisation. In the same speech, he drew attention to the links of
Hashd al-Shaabi,  and said, ‘Iran’s Persian expansionism has started to cause quite a
headache.’158 Unlike Turkey,  the Iranian government encouraged and supported the
46
PMF’s participation in future operations and blamed Turkey for undermining the unity
and territorial integrity of Iraq. 
After long debates between the relevant parties and partly because of  the pressure
from America, the PMF militia was barred from taking an active role in the battle of
Mosul between October 2016 and July 2017. Iraqi observation of the Turkish concerns
throughout  the  operation  and  a  series  of  diplomatic  exchanges,  eased  the  tension
between Ankara and Baghdad. Meanwhile, Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan
Region  in  Iraq,  designated  September  25,  2017  as  the  date  for  the  referendum for
independence of the KRG. This decision sparked harsh reactions from both Baghdad
and neighbouring capitals Tehran and Ankara, and compelled the three countries to set
their differences aside and develop a joint position to prevent the independence of the
KRG. 
The referendum issue set the agenda of the visit of General Bagheri, the top Iranian
commander, to Ankara in August 2017. Following this, the foreign ministers of Iraq,
Iran and Turkey held a trilateral meeting in New York on September 20, 2017 to discuss
the  referendum  plan  of  the  KRG.  At  the  end  of  the  meeting  they  issued  a  joint
statement. The ministers, through the joint statement, expressed their concerns with
regard to  the planned independence referendum by the KRG that  would put  Iraq’s
hard-earned  gains  against  ISIS  at  great  risk.  It  was  also  argued  that  the  planned
referendum was ‘unconstitutional’ and ‘run[ned] the risk of provoking new conflicts in
the region, that [would] prove difficult to contain.’ Consequently, they reaffirmed their
strong commitment to the territorial integrity and political unity of Iraq, stressed their
unequivocal  opposition to the referendum and urged the KRG leadership to refrain
from holding the referendum.159 Despite the warnings and threats from neighbouring
countries to compel Erbil to cancel the referendum, which none of the international
actors except Israel backed, the KRG held it on the planned day, and the majority of the
Kurdish electorates voted for independence. 
During  Erdoğan’s  visit  to  Tehran  in  October  2017,  the  Turkish  and  Iranian  leaders
reiterated their common opposition to the referendum and their commitment to the
preservation  of  Iraq’s  territorial  integrity.  They  offered  the  KRG  leaders  a  choice
between  declaring  the  referendum  null  and  void,  or  facing  isolation  and  the  joint
actions of Turkey and Iran to protect ‘political borders.’  Both countries closed their
borders  and  airspaces  to  the  KRG,  and  decided  to  support  the  Iraqi  government’s
measures to protect its territorial integrity and political unity. Moreover, Iraq, Iran and
Turkey agreed to the establishment of a consultation mechanism between themselves
for the coordination of their sanctions against the KRG.160 Soon after, the Iraqi armed
forces  staged  major  operations  in  order  to  take  over  control  of  Kirkuk  and  other
disputed territories between Baghdad and Erbil in October 2017, fully backed by Turkey
and Iran. Eventually, the KRG was forced to declare the suspension of the referendum
results. 
Consequently,  the  process  of  state  building  in  Iraq  subsequent  to  the  American
occupation tempted Iranian and Turkish interests and interference, which turned into
a  rivalry  between  Ankara  and  Tehran.  Both  countries  competed  to  assure  their
friendship to the central government in Baghdad and other influential actors in Iraqi
politics. They even competed to influence Iraqi Kurdish leaders. However, the age-old
security  anxieties  of  Turkey  and  Iran  that  have  derived  from  the  potential
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independence of  a  Kurdish state led them to put their  differences and competition
aside, and to engage in joint efforts for the containment of the shared threat.
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The Future of Turkish-Iranian
Relations
Although  successive  states  and  governments  have  ruled  over  the  contemporary
territories of Turkey and Iran, they have been neighbours for over five hundred years.
Over  time,  they have not  only  experienced numerous  wars,  fierce  competition and
instances  of  intimate  relations,  but  also  developed  and  maintained  a  culture  of
diplomacy. That diplomatic culture, based on the preservation of the ‘fine line’ between
cooperation,  friendly  competition  and  fierce  rivalry,  has  been  partly  dictated  by
geopolitics, history and structural differences between the two countries, and partly
shaped by the ruling elite.162 
Geopolitics has played a crucial role in Turkish-Iranian relations throughout history.163
Located on two edges  of  a  key  geographic  area  bridging Asia  and Europe,  political
power in these respective territories emerged as barriers limiting the expansion of the
other’s influence.  Rising imperial  powers based in these countries tempted them to
advance against the other, which led to numerous confrontations throughout history.
The declining power of the rival imperial states based in these two countries lessened
the expansionist tension and facilitated relatively stable, and closer relations between
the two countries. Geopolitics in modern times has dictated new concerns and provided
new  opportunities  to  Turkey  and  Iran.  Modern  Turkish  and Iranian  states  have
emerged as middle powers roughly equivalent to each other. Vulnerable to external
interventions  and  internal  challenges,  Turkey  and  Iran  have  prioritised  the
preservation of the status quo on their borders and in their neighbourhood.164 In this
respect, there have been two long-term and fundamental challenges to the status quo
and security of the respective states; the Kurdish question and the Azerbaijan question.
The Kurdish people have dispersed into four countries in accordance with the post-War
settlements  subsequent  to  WWI.  Various  Kurdish  movements  revolted  against  this
status  quo in  each  country  mostly  seeking  autonomy,  which  was  regarded  by  the
regional states, that is Iran and Turkey, as a fundamental challenge to national security
and  territorial  integrity.  Additionally,  the  countries  that  have  been  hosting  a
considerable Kurdish minority population have dreaded the idea of an independent
Kurdish state in the region, which emerged as a perception of a common threat that
has  brought  regional  states  together.  However,  regional  states  have  a  practice  of
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exploiting the Kurdish revolts in neighbouring countries either to force concessions
from neighbouring hostile regimes, or for the purpose of ensuring their own national
security. As a result, throughout the twentieth century and after, the Kurdish question
has  emerged  as  source  of  both  contention  and  cooperation  between  the  regional
countries.165 Considering the persistence of  regional  geopolitics  around the Kurdish
people and the challenges to that status quo,  we can safely argue that the Kurdish
question  will  continue  to  be  an  influential  issue  in  the  future  of  Turkish-Iranian
relations. 
The  history  of  the  Azerbaijan  question  arguably  dates  back  to  the  Golestan  and
Turkmenchay treaties between Iran and Russia in the early nineteenth century, which
culminated in the division of ancient Azerbaijan between Russia and Iran. The rise of
Turkish nationalism among the Azerbaijani people in the early twentieth century, and
the temporary independence of Azerbaijan that remained beyond the borders of Iran,
turned the  Azerbaijan  question  into  a  security  issue  for  the  Iranian  establishment.
Since then,  successive Iranian governments  have had misgivings with the potential
Turkish incitement of nationalist and separatist feeling among the Azerbaijani people,
who constitute the largest minority group in Iran. The independence of the Azerbaijan
Republic along with some other Turkic states in Central Asia following the collapse of
the Soviet Union, has not only revived the Turkish interests in these countries, but also
the  conventional  Iranian  fears  of  Pan-Turkism.  Although  Turkish  and  Azerbaijani
governments have consciously avoided stirring unrest among the Turkic people in Iran,
the Azerbaijan question remains an important concern on the security agenda of Iran. 
The geopolitical location of Turkey and Iran also compels them to maintain at least a
minimum  level  of  cooperation  between  their  respective  governments.  Firstly,  as
adjoining neighbouring states they need to coordinate their actions for the protection
of their borders and for the security of the border areas. Indeed, the issue of border
security and the related Turkish-Iranian dealings have been on the agenda since the
turn of the twentieth century, and it will likely continue to be.
Secondly,  they  need  to  use  routes  passing  through  the  other’s  territories  for
transportation of goods either for the purpose of exportation or importation. Trade,
transportation and issues related to the safety of trade routes were on the agenda of
bilateral relations even at the height of the imperial rivalry between the Ottomans and
the Safavids, and continues to be an influential factor in contemporary Turkish-Iranian
relations. A considerable amount of Iranian imports from the Western countries, and
its exports to European markets are transported via Turkey. Likewise, a considerable
amount of Turkish trade with the Central Asian countries passes through the Iranian
territories.  For  this  reason,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  Joint  Economic  Council
meetings between Iran and Turkey that were institutionalised in the mid-1980s have
emerged as the most persistent pattern in Ankara-Tehran relations.
Finally,  the  new  energy  geopolitics  has  started  to  effect  Turkish-Iranian  relations,
especially  since  the  mid-twentieth  century.  The  growing  share  of  oil  as  an  energy
source in contemporary economic structures has led Turkey, an oil poor country, to be
dependent on oil  imports.  Considering the rich reserves in Iran,  successive Turkish
governments have approached Tehran to match its needs for oil. Likewise, the growing
share of natural gas in present-day economies since the 1990s has again led Turkey to
turn  towards  Iran,  which  has  the  second  largest  gas  reserves.  Thus,  Turkish
dependency on energy imports has coincided with Iranian search for markets for its oil
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and gas, which has reinforced Turkish-Iranian energy dealings. Until  a fundamental
transformation  of  energy geopolitics, energy  trade  will  be  on  the  agenda  of  both
Ankara and Tehran. 
Additionally,  Turkish-Iranian  relations  are  not  immune  to  the  effects  of  regional
developments and great power politics. Following the establishment of nation-states in
their respective countries in the early 1920s, either because of their preoccupation with
internal challenges, or because of the dominant role of the great powers around Turkey
and Iran, both countries avoided seeking influence beyond their borders. Subsequent to
the rise of Cold War, both Ankara and Tehran allied with the United States against the
Soviet  threat,  which  culminated  in  close  relations  between  them.  However,  Iran’s
reversal to anti-Americanism after the revolution of 1979 adversely affected Turkish-
Iranian relations. Moreover, the geopolitical changes in the Caucasus and Central Asia
in  the  aftermath  of  the  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  geopolitical
transformation of the Middle East following the two Gulf Wars, gave Turkey and Iran an
appetite to increase their influence in these areas. Thus, Ankara and Tehran entered
into  a  fierce  regional  competition  that  continued  with  an  inability  for  either  to
dominate over the other, or for the return of great powers, or for the rise of common
threats.  Considering the imperial  background and cultural  influences of  both states
which reach beyond their  political  borders,  we could estimate that  the geopolitical
transformations  and  emerging  power  vacuums  in  the  common  neighbourhoods  of
Turkey and Iran, will likely lead to revival of regional competition in different forms in
future as well.
Against  this  geopolitical  background,  the  different  religious  and  ethnolinguistic
identities  of  Iran  and  Turkey  are  argued  to  play  effective  roles  in  Turkish-Iranian
relations.  Although both countries  have multicultural  societal  structures,  there is  a
dominant Persian linguistic identity and Shiite religious identity in Iran against the
predominantly ethnically Turkish and religiously Sunni identity in Turkey. However,
rather  than  playing  a  defining  role  per  se,  as  evidenced  by  the  lack  of  continuous
fighting between the two countries, identity differences are mostly regarded as part of
geopolitical  considerations.  Thus,  identity differences have played a complementary
role  in  the  regional  rivalry  between Turkey  and Iran,  and  their  security  concerns.
Therefore, sectarian and national differences between the two countries will continue
to remain in the future, however, they will likely play their role in the case of a regional
competition coloured with sectarianism.
In this regard, the role of elite and political leaders has come to play relatively more
effective  roles  through  their  assessments  of  geopolitics,  and  their  foreign  policy
preferences. That is why any shift in leadership in either country may culminate in
considerable  changes  in  Turkish-Iranian  relations.  In  this  respect,  successive  JDP
governments  have  opted  for  enhancing  Turkey’s  relations  with  Iran  for  different
economic,  strategic  and  political  reasons.  They  have  employed  rationalisation,
institutionalisation, and compartmentalisation strategies to deal with Iran, which have
facilitated the steady growth of Turkish-Iranian relations. The rationalisation process
has led to a downgrading of ideological considerations from the agenda of bilateral
relations that facilitated the focus on potential opportunities and issues of common
interest. The frequency of diplomatic exchanges has increased considerably and has
culminated in the formalisation of a number of agreements, and the institutionalisation
of diplomatic relations (See Tables 1 and 2). Finally, the compartmentalisation strategy
has added a multi-dimensional perspective to Turkish-Iranian relations and brought
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relieving issues of cooperation from the adverse effects of contention in various fields.
While regional  context has mostly played a conducive role for the improvement of
Ankara-Tehran relations, at times, it has also instigated competition between the two
countries.  Nevertheless,  the  rationalisation,  institutionalisation  and
compartmentalisation have not meant the removal of all obstacles and the conciliation
of all differences between the two countries. Indeed, as Jenkins highlighted, there is an
asymmetry and a contrast between the repeated enthusiasm in the public declarations
of officials to further bilateral relations and commitments to future cooperation, and a
failure to translate that rhetoric into action. Moreover, there have been considerable
fluctuations in Ankara-Tehran relations throughout the seventeen years of JDP power
in  Turkey,166 which  indicates  the  limits  of  an  analysis  which  solely  relies  on  elite
preferences. 
Actually, through the decades of neighbourhood, Turkey and Iran have developed a
complicated  relationship  that  defies  simplistic  explanations  based  exclusively  on
geopolitics, geo-economics, identity, and elite preferences. It is possible to detect two
simultaneous but contrasting trends in Turkish-Iranian relations, one tilting towards
competition and the other tilting towards cooperation.167 The compartmentalisation
strategy employed by the respective governments in Ankara and Tehran to separate
issues of contention and conciliation, have facilitated the maintenance of a ‘fine line’
between cooperation, friendly competition and fierce rivalry. The level of cooperation
or  rivalry  between them is  shaped  by  the  mutual  or  clashing  interests  of  the  two
countries which are influenced by geopolitics and elite preferences.168 This diplomatic




Table 1. Visits paid by High-Level Iranian officials to Turkey, 2002-2018
Official Date Occasion





President Ahmadinejad Aug. 2008 State visit
President Ahmadinejad Nov. 2009 OIC – ISEDAK Summit
Mohammad  Reza  Rahimi
Vice-President
5 Jan. 2010 Meeting of Aghanistan’s Neighbors, Istanbul
President Ahmadinejad 7 June 2010 CICA Conference, Istanbul









President Ahmadinejad 8 May 2011 UN Conference on Least Developed Countries
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Mohammad  Reza  Rahimi,
Vice-President
5 Oct. 2012 State visit




OIC Summit in Istanbul,
3rd meeting of the HCC in Ankara 












2nd Iran-Russia-Turkey  Summit  meeting  within  the








5th meeting of the HCC
Source: These events are collected from various news reports and chronologies on Iranian-Turkish
relations. It excludes visits of speakers of parliament, foreign ministers, and ministers.














































State visit – Joint declaration for the establishment of High-













3rd Iran-Russia-Turkey Summit meeting within the framework
of Astana process
Source: These events are collected from various news reports and chronologies on Iranian-Turkish
relations. It excludes visits of speakers of parliament, foreign ministers, and ministers.
Table 3. Turkey-Iran Trade Relations, 2002-2018 (million $)
Years Turkish Export Turkish Import Total Trade Volume
2002 300 918 1.218
2003 523 1.857 2.380
2004 803 1.950 2.753
2005 905 3.469 4.375
2006 1.057 5.623 6.680
2007 1.380 6.600 7.980
2008 2.028 8.199 10.228
2009 2.024 3.405 5.403
2010 3.042 7.644 10.687
2011 3.590 12.461 16.051
2012 9.922 11.964 21.887
2013 4.193 10.383 14.577
2014 3.888 9.833 13.721
2015 3.665 6.096 9.761
2016 4.966 4.699 9.665
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2017 3.259 7.492 10.751
2018 2,394 6,931 9,325
Source: ‘Türkiye-İran Dış Ticareti,’ T.C. Ticaret Bakanlığı, 28 March 2019, https://ticaret.gov.tr/yurtdisi-
teskilati/guney-asya/iran/ulke-profili/ekonomik-gorunum/turkiye-ile-ticaret (accessed on May 30,
2019).
 
Table 4. Exchange of Tourists between Turkey and Iran, 2002-2018















2016 1,665,160 243, 559
2017 2,541,968 N.A.
2018 2,001,744 N.A.
Source: Data is retrieved from various sources including TÜRSAB, ‘2017 Tahran Uluslararası Turizm
Fuarı Değerlendirme Raporu,’ https://www.tursab.org.tr/apps/OldFiles//dosya/15825/tahran-turizm-
fuar-raporu_15825_6240747.pdf (accessed on May 30, 2019); T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, Turizm
İstatisikleri, http://yigm.kulturturizm.gov.tr/TR-9851/turizm-istatistikleri.html (accessed on May 30,
2019); Ceyhun Can Ozan, ‘İran ve Türkiye Turizm İlişkileri, İRAM, September 2017, https://
www.iramcenter.org/d_hbanaliz/A_Ceyhun_Can_Ozcan_Yran_ve_Turkiye_Turizm_YliYkileri.pdf
(accessed on May 30, 2019); ‘Türkiye-İran Ekonomik İlişkileri Bilgi Notu,’ https://kuto.org.tr/site/assets/
files/1585/turkiye-iran_ekonomik_ve_ticari_iliskiler_bilgi_notu.pdf (accessed on May 30, 2019).
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